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Abstract
A group of agents have uncertain needs on a resource, and the resource has to be
allocated before uncertainty resolves. We propose a parametric class of division rules
we call equal-quantile rules. The parameter λ of an equal-quantile rule is the maximal
probability of satiation imposed on agents — for each agent, the probability that his
assignment is no less than his realized need is at most λ. It determines the extent to
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which the resource should be used to satiate agents. If the resource is no more than the
sum of the agents’ λ-quantile assignments, it is fully allocated and the rule equalizes
the probabilities of satiation across agents. Otherwise, each agent just receives his
λ-quantile assignment. Four familiar axioms, strict ranking, continuity, consistency,
and ordinality, when extended to the uncertain context, characterize the equal-quantile
class. Moreover, the rules are optimal with respect to two utilitarian objectives, which
not only provide relevant welfare interpretations of λ, but also show how the rules
balance the concerns for generating waste and deficit across agents.
Keywords: Resource allocation, Fair division, Uncertain needs, Equal-quantile rules,
Utilitarian social welfare function, Waste, Deficit, Ordinality
JEL classification: D44, D63, D71, D82.
1 Introduction
How to divide a resource among agents who have conflicting claims on the resource has
been extensively studied since O’Neill (1982). However, the studies are largely limited
to situations with deterministic claims. Little has been done regarding situations in which
agents have uncertain claims that arise from their uncertain needs. If a resource can be
divided after uncertainty resolves, then the division rules developed in the deterministic
context can be adapted for realized needs. But in many real-life situations, a resource has
to be divided ex-ante and ex-post reallocation is not an option.
For example, an international emergency management organization distributes rescue
forces/medical supplies among assistance centers across the world in preparation for ran-
dom emergency strikes. Since emergency response is time sensitive, transferring unused
rescue supplies from one area to another area may have little effect. A government allocates
budgets to local authorities to finance local public facilities (public hospitals or roads) with
a rough knowledge of local public demands (Copas, 1993). Due to physical constraints, it
could be costly to downsize an underutilized public facility or expand an over-demanded
one. An academic institute divides grants among various departments to support research
activities (seminars or conferences) based on an estimate of the number of participants.
Due to institutional constraints, there may be no flexibility in reallocating grants among the
departments to match the realized numbers of participants in the various activities.
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Formally, there is a one-dimensional and perfectly divisible resource. An agent’s need
on the resource is understood as his satiation point. When he gets less than he needs, he
is better off from more of the resource; as soon as need is satisfied, he is indifferent to any
increase of the resource. The uncertain need of an agent is represented by a cumulative
distribution function (CDF), called a claim. The minimal value of its support is the sure
need, and the maximal value the maximal need. Agents’ claims are objectively verifiable
and non-manipulable. A problem for a population of agents consists of the profile of claims
and a non-negative endowment of the resource. An allocation is a vector of assignments
such that no agent gets more than his maximal need, and the sum of the assignments is
no more than the endowment. A rule chooses, for each population and each problem this
population may face, an allocation. We search for desirable rules.
Difficulties arise when needs are uncertain and division is committed. If the amount of
the resource assigned to an agent turns out to exceed his realized need, some of the resource
is wasted; if the assigned amount turns out to fall short of his realized need, he still lacks
for some of the resource. Reducing the risk in generating waste necessarily increases the
risk in generating deficit, and vice versa. This leads to two important questions.
First, to what extent should the resource be used to satiate agents? Full use of the
resource is required in the deterministic fair division literature because of efficiency con-
siderations (Thomson (2017)).1 But when satiation points are uncertain, waste is typically
inevitable, and it could incur an opportunity cost which impairs efficiency (see Section 5).
Thus, our feasibility only requires the sum of the assignments not to exceed the endowment,
and a rule should recommend the extent to which the resource is used to satiate agents.
Second, how should the concerns for waste and deficit be balanced across agents with
different claims? Due to the difference in the probability distributions of agents’ needs, the
same assignment to different agents induces different risks of waste and deficit. Reducing
the risk of waste/deficit for one agent may well increase that for another. Thus, a rule
should also provide a way to deal with the trade-offs across agents.
To address the two questions, we introduce a class of rules we call equal-quantile rules,
parameterized by λ ∈ (0, 1]. The equal-quantile rule with λ works as follows. When the
endowment is no more than the sum of the sure needs, the classical “constrained equal
1In particular, all agents should be satiated if there is enough of the resource, and the resource should be
fully allocated if it is limited.
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awards” method is applied to the profile of the sure needs.2 The rule fully allocates the
resource and makes assignments as equal as possible, subject to the constraint that no
agent receives more than his sure need. When the endowment exceeds the sum of the sure
needs, each agent receives an α-quantile assignment, where α is the same for all agents and
is maximized subject to the feasibility constraint and to the constraint that it not exceed λ.
Loosely, α is a common “probability of satiation” — for each agent, the probability of his
need being covered by his assignment is α. The maximal common probability of satiation
λ determines the extent to which a resource should be used to satiate agents. Each agent’s
maximal assignment is his λ-quantile assignment. The resource is fully allocated only if it
is no more than the sum of the maximal assignments; otherwise, each agent just receives
his maximal assignment. When λ < 1, agents are never satiated for sure.
Four familiar axioms in the deterministic fair division literature, when extended to the
uncertain context, characterize the equal-quantile class. The first is strict ranking. It re-
quires that an agent be assigned more than another agent if his claim is larger than the other
agent’s in the first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) sense. The second is continuity. It re-
quires the allocation not to change too much if the claims and the endowment do not change
too much. The other two axioms, consistency and ordinality, are invariance properties.
Consistency says that after an allocation is chosen and some agents leave with their as-
signments, if the remaining agents re-divide what is left, then each of them should receive
his initial assignment. Different from the deterministic context, the initial endowment may
not be fully allocated. Thus, depending on whether the unassigned resource has been given
away to an alternative use, what is left is either the sum of the remaining agents’ initial as-
signments or the difference between the initial endowment and the sum of the assignments
to those who leave. We require the assignments to the remaining agents to be invariant in
both situations since both are plausible.
Ordinality requires the way of allocating the resource to be invariant with respect to a
common increasing and continuous transformation of claims and endowment. It is often the
case in real life that there is an underlying production technology that converts the resource
to some output and an agent’s need for the resource comes from his need for the output.
Assume that due to a common technology shock, the production function has undergone
an increasing and continuous transformation, which gives each agent a correspondingly
2The constrained equal awards method is also known as the uniform gains method in the literature.
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transformed claim on the resource. Assume also that the endowment is reset to be the sum
of the agents’ initial assignments subjected to the same transformation, so that their needs
for the output can be met in the initial way. In this case, we require that agents receive their
transformed assignments and have their needs for the output met as initially.
Going back to our first question, while the axioms characterize the rules that set a
maximal probability of satiation λ to determine the extent to which a resource should be
used to satiate agents, a further examination of the optimality of the rules suggests how λ
should be chosen. Assume that each agent obtains a common and constant marginal utility
u > 0 from each unit of his assignment capped at his realized need. Assume also that
there is an alternative way of using the resource outside the model, and this outside agent
obtains a constant marginal utility v ∈ [0, u) from each unit of the leftover resource. The
equal-quantile rule with λ = u−vu selects, for each problem, an allocation that maximizes
the expected sum of the utilities of all agents including the outside agent. As the ratio of v
to u gets smaller, using more of the resource within the model improves the social welfare,
so the maximal probability of satiation λ gets larger. As long as v > 0, agents should never
be satiated for sure, i.e., λ < 1. This suggests that to choose λ, a planner should explore,
outside the data of a problem, more information on alternative uses of the resource.
Going back to our second question, an equivalent cost-minimization objective explicitly
shows how the rules balance the concerns for waste and deficit across agents, although their
characterizing axioms, originating in the deterministic fair division literature, have nothing
to do with waste or balance. Assume that each unit of waste incurs a constant marginal cost
cw ≥ 0 and deficit cd > 0. The costs can be understood as opportunity costs generated by an
allocation (see Section 5). The equal-quantile rule with λ = c
d
cw+cd minimizes the sum of the
aggregate expected waste and the aggregate expected deficit, weighted, respectively, by cw
and cd. The ratio of cw to cd reflects the balance between waste and deficit, and determines
the maximal probability of satiation as analogous to the ratio of v and u. The objective
function also shows that the trade-offs across agents are achieved in a utilitarian manner.
Lastly, an important result that helps to establish our characterization is that three fa-
miliar axioms, when extended to the uncertain context, provide a guideline on assessing the
extent to which the resource should be used to satiate agents. They are, respectively, sym-
metry, which requires agents with equal claims to receive equal assignments; endowment
continuity, which requires a rule to be continuous in endowment only; and consistency.
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They together imply that on each agent, a maximal assignment that depends only on his
claim should be imposed, and a resource be fully allocated when and only when it does not
exceed the sum of the agents’ maximal assignments.
1.1 Related literature
Resource allocation with deterministic claims has been extensively studied from a norma-
tive perspective in the rationing/bankruptcy literature.3 The key difference between our
work and this literature is that when claims are uncertain, two questions that are specific
to the uncertain context arise. To what extent should a resource be used to satiate agents?
How should the trade-offs between waste and deficit be balanced across agents? To address
the two questions, we introduce equal-quantile rules. While equal-quantile rules reduce to
the constrained equal awards rule on the deterministic domain, they are closer in spirit
to equal-sacrifice rules studied by Young (1987b, 1988, 1990) for the taxation problem.4
There, a tax burden is divided among agents with different (deterministic) taxable incomes.
Each equal-sacrifice rule is associated with a utility measure of income and divides a tax
burden by equalizing the utility losses of agents from their tax payments. Equal-quantile
rules are special equal-sacrifice rules if the sacrifice of an agent is defined to be the dif-
ference between his maximal probability of satiation imposed by the rule and his actual
probability of satiation given by his assignment.5 The axiomatic foundation of the general
class of equal-sacrifice rules under uncertainty is an open question.
Resource allocation with uncertain needs has rarely been studied from a normative per-
spective. The most closely related papers are Xue (2018a,b) and Long and Xue (2019). Xue
(2018a,b) focuses on the issue of waste and proposes axioms that explicitly address how
the risk of generating waste should affect the resource allocation. In contrast, we address
3For example, the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule are studied by
Sprumont (1991), Dagan (1996), Herrero and Villar (2001, 2002), Yeh (2004, 2006, 2008), Martı´nez (2008),
and Marchant (2008). The proportional rule is studied by Banker (1981), O’Neill (1982), Moulin (1987), and
Chun (1988). The TAL-family is studied by Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006); the ICI and CIC families are
studied by Thomson (2008). Excellent surveys are provided by Moulin (2002) and Thomson (2003, 2015).
4Chambers and Moreno-Ternero (2017) further define and characterize a class of generalized equal-
sacrifice rules that includes, in particular, the constrained equal awards rule.
5More generally, given an arbitrary utility measure in the uncertain context, the sacrifice of an agent can
be defined as the difference between the maximal utility that he would obtain with no feasibility constraint
and the actual utility that he obtains from his assignment.
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the trade-offs between waste and deficit, and our axioms are extensions of existing ones in
the deterministic fair division literature. Moreover, while Xue (2018a,b) assumes that the
endowment never exceeds the sum of the maximal needs and has to be fully allocated, we
allow the endowment to be arbitrarily large and partially allocated.
Long and Xue (2019) extend the class of parametric rules, an important class introduced
by Young (1987a), to the uncertain context.6 Generalizing Young (1987a)’s results on the
deterministic domain, they characterize the extended class and show that each parametric
rule minimizes a cost function. Our equal-quantile class is a subclass of the extended para-
metric class, and is characterized with two additional axioms (strict ranking and ordinality).
Moreover, the optimality of equal-quantile rules is not a corollary of their result, since the
cost-minimization objective of an equal-quantile rule, that has a relevant interpretation in
terms of the balance of waste and deficit, cannot be constructed using their method.
We are also aware of the following axiomatic studies on resource allocation with un-
certain needs. Yager and Kreinovich (2000) model uncertain needs as intervals and charac-
terize a version of the proportional rule (see also Branzei, Dimitrov, Pickl and Tijs (2004),
Woeginger (2006)). Ertemel and Kumar (2018) study state-contingent needs, and char-
acterize the “ex-ante” and “ex-post” proportional rules. Those works, having different
focuses, do not study the conflict between waste and deficit under uncertainty.
In contrast with the limited amount of normative studies on resource allocation with
uncertain needs, there is a rich operations research literature on this subject, especially in
the areas of inventory management, emergency control, project management, and network
design (e.g., Arrow, Harris, and Marschak (1951), Qin, Wang, Vakharia, Chen, and Seref
(2011), Johansson and Sternad (2005), Rawls and Turnquist (2010), Turnquist and Nozick
(2003), Wex, Schryen, and Neumann (2012)). There, an objective function is typically
assumed, and the focus is on finding algorithms to solve for optimal allocations.
Among these studies, the closest to ours is the newsvendor problem. It consists of a
probabilistic demand on a perishable good (e.g., newspaper) represented by a CDF Fi, a
unit purchasing price c, and a unit selling price p > c. A manager selects an amount to stock
to maximize expected profit. The optimal stock, known as Littlewood’s rule (Littlewood
6Kaminski (2000, 2006) extends Young (1987a) to a setting where agents have abstract types. Different
from Long and Xue (2019), both Young (1987a) and Kaminski (2000, 2006) assume that each agent has an
exogenously given upper bound on his assignment, and the resource, never exceeding the sum of the upper
bounds, has to be fully allocated.
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(1972)), is given by F−1i
(
p−c
p
)
. It depends on the marginal cost of overstocking, c, and
that of understocking, p − c, in the same way as the maximal assignments to our agents
depend on the marginal costs of waste and deficit. The difference is that we focus on the
axiomatic foundation of our rules. Moreover, the newsvendor problem is an unconstrained
single-agent optimization problem, while the optimization problem solved by our rules is
a constrained multi-agent problem that generalizes the newsvendor problem.
Our characterization is mostly related to Chambers (2009). In an abstract environment
where the primitive is the space of CDFs, Chambers (2009) studies functions on this space
and characterizes the quantile functions of CDFs by the axioms of monotonicity, upper
semicontinuity, and ordinal covariance.7 These axioms resemble our strict ranking, con-
tinuity, and ordinality. Besides, our equal-quantile rules, when restricted to single-agent
problems with sufficiently large endowments, are the quantile functions of CDFs. But, in
general, we deal with the problem of dividing a limited resource among a group of agents
with different claims, which is beyond the scope of Chambers (2009)’s application. More-
over, due to the difference between the two models, the restrictions imposed by the axioms
are different. For example, ordinal covariance of Chambers (2009) deals with transfor-
mations of one individual CDF; our ordinality deals with common transformations of all
claims and the endowment. While each continuous CDF can be transformed to any other
CDF in an increasing and continuous manner, not every profile of CDFs can be transformed
to any other profile. Thus, the techniques used in deriving the implications of the axioms
are different.
Our model and rules are also related to Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2006, 2012).
They study how to divide a resource among agents who are equipped with output functions
that convert the assigned resource into outputs. They characterize, respectively in the two
papers, a class of “index-egalitarian” rules,8 and two extreme rules in this class, one of
which equalizes the outputs of agents. Our agents’ claims are CDFs which play the role of
their output functions, and each equal-quantile rule equalizes the probabilities of satiation
among agents. But claims and output functions are different objects and there are two main
7One application is related to risk measures in the insurance literature (Wang, Young, and Panjer (1997)
and Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999)). Thomson (1979) also studies a problem in which distribution
functions are agents’ private information, and characterizes all the payment schemes that incentivize an agent
to truthfully reveal a pre-specified quantile of his distribution.
8Chun, Jang, and Ju (2014) provide alternative characterizations in a fixed-population setting.
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differences between their characterization and ours. First, their characterizations invoke a
no-domination and an additivity axiom (“priority” and “composition down”, respectively),
while ours does not invoke any no-domination- and additivity-type requirements. Second,
in their model, in which there is no uncertainty, a resource is always fully allocated and
no upper bound is imposed on an agent’s assignment. Our agents have uncertain satiation
points, and our rules recommend how much of the resource should be used to satiate agents.
Quantile decision rules are also used in individual choices under uncertainty. For ex-
ample, Rostek (2010) axiomatizes the quantile-maximization rule in a Savage setting; de
Castro and Galvao (2019) axiomatize a class of recursive quantile preferences in a dynamic
model. Moreover, distributive justice under uncertainty has also been explored in the other
contexts. For example, cost sharing of risky projects is studied by Hougaard and Moulin
(2018), ex-ante egalitarian division of a stochastic cost is studied by Koster and Boonen
(2019), and social welfare orderings that assess risky social situations are studied by Fleur-
baey (2010) and Fleurbaey, Gajdos and Zuber (2015).
2 The model
Let R be the set of real numbers, R+ non-negative real numbers, R++ positive real numbers,
and N positive integers. Let N be the set of all finite subsets of N. Potential agents are
labeled by elements of N. A population is an element of N .
A one-dimensional and perfectly divisible resource is to be allocated among a pop-
ulation of agents, each of whom needs some of the resource. The need of an agent is
understood as his satiation point. When the resource that he obtains falls short of his
need, he is better off with more of the resource, and as soon as he obtains what he needs,
he becomes indifferent to any further increase of the resource. The need of an agent is
uncertain in general and is represented by a CDF, called the claim of the agent. We assume
that each claim has a finite interval support in R+.9 Let F be the set of such claims. We
denote a typical element of F by Fi. Given Fi ∈ F , we denote, respectively, by ci and Ci
the minimal and maximal values of the support of Fi, omitting the dependent variable Fi
in the notation. Note that ci is the amount of the resource that agent i needs for sure, and
9We assume interval supports for simplicity. This assumption excludes an important case of discrete needs
(except for deterministic needs), which deserves further research.
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is called the sure need of agent i; Ci is the maximal amount of the resource that agent i
would possibly need, and is called the maximal need of agent i. Given I ∈ N , we denote
by F a typical claim profile for population I, i.e., F = (Fi)i∈I where for each i ∈ I, Fi ∈ F .
For each I ∈ N , we denote by F I the set of claim profiles for population I.
Let I ∈ N . A claims problem, or simply a problem, for population I is a pair (F,T ),
where F ∈ F I is a claim profile and T ∈ R+ is an endowment of the resource.10 Let
PI be the set of all problems for population I. An allocation for (F,T ) ∈ PI is a vector
t ∈ RI+ such that for each i ∈ I, ti, which is called the assignment to agent i, is no larger
than his maximal need Ci, and
∑
ti ≤ T . An original feature of the model in which agents
have uncertain satiation points is that it may no longer be desirable to make full use of the
resource to satiate the agents.11 Our rules will advise a planner, who faces a feasibility
constraint, on whether and to what extent agents should be satiated.
Let i ∈ N and Fi ∈ F . Let ti ∈ [0,Ci] be an assignment to agent i. When ti exceeds
agent i’s realized need xi, agent i only uses xi units of the resource and the extra amount
ti − xi is called the waste generated by agent i. When xi exceeds ti, he uses ti units of the
resource, and xi − ti is called the deficit of agent i. We call Fi(ti), the probability that agent
i’s need is no more than his assignment, agent i’s probability of satiation. When ti = Ci,
agent i is said to be satiated for sure. A division rule, or simply a rule, is a function r that
specifies for each problem in
⋃
I∈N
PI an allocation. For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and
each i ∈ I, we denote by ri(F,T ) agent i’s assignment given by r.
Our problems do not contain information on the underlying joint distributions of agents’
needs. There is no loss when agents’ needs are subject to idiosyncratic risk. When their
needs are correlated, it is an open question how the resource allocation should depend
on the correlation (see Section 6), but still, our model applies in the following scenarios.
First, an allocation has to be chosen based on marginal distributions if the underlying joint
distribution is too complicated to obtain compared with the marginal distributions. Second,
when a planner has a utilitarian objective function, the joint distribution is not needed;
the optimal allocations depend only on the marginal distributions (see Section 5). Third,
if a planner thinks that an agent should not be responsible for things that are beyond his
10In the literature of deterministic claims problems, it is commonly assumed that T is no more than the
sum of the agents’ deterministic claims. We do not impose this restriction in our model, and we allow the
endowment not to be fully allocated.
11See the Introduction and Section 5.
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individual claim, then how claims are correlated is of no concern to the planner.
3 Equal-quantile rules
We propose a class of rules which we call equal-quantile rules. Each equal-quantile rule
is associated with a parameter λ ∈ (0, 1], and is composed of two parts depending on the
endowment. First, when the endowment does not exceed the sum of the agents’ sure needs,
the well-known constrained equal awards method is applied to the profile of sure needs.
That is, the rule makes assignments as equal as possible subject to the constraint that no
agent receives more than his sure need. In particular, when all agents have deterministic
claims, the rule selects the constrained equal awards allocation. Second, when the endow-
ment exceeds the sum of the agents’ sure needs, a new method that we propose is applied.
Loosely speaking, the allocation is calculated by equating probabilities of satiation across
agents, and the common probability of satiation is maximized subject to the feasibility con-
straint and to the constraint that it not exceed the parameter λ. Thus, λ serves as an upper
bound on the common probability of satiation; it has no impact on the first part of the rule.
Example 1. We illustrate the equal-quantile rule with λ = 0.75 in Figure 1 using the
following problem. There are two agents, 1 and 2, whose claims are, respectively,
F1(x1) =

0 x1 < 1.75
1
7 (x1 − 1.75) + 0.25 1.75 ≤ x1 < 6.5
1 x1 ≥ 6.5
and F2(x2) =

0 x2 < 2
1
2 (x2 − 2)
1
2 2 ≤ x2 < 6
1 x2 ≥ 6
.
Thus, agent 1 has a sure need of 1.75 and agent 2 has a sure need of 2.
When the endowment does not exceed the sum of their sure needs, 1.75 + 2, the con-
strained equal awards method is applied for sure needs. If T = 2, the assignments are
t1 = t2 = 1. When the endowment exceeds 1.75 + 2, loosely speaking, the rule chooses
the maximal allocation that equates probabilities of satiation across agents, subject to the
feasibility constraint and the upper-bound constraint on the probabilities of satiation. If
T = 4, the assignments are t′1 = 1.75 and t
′
2 = 2.25, since F1(t
′
1) = F2(t
′
2) = 0.25 < λ
and t′1 + t
′
2 = 4. Since agent 1’s claim is discontinuous at 1.75, when T increases from
1.75 × 2 to 4, his assignment remains unchanged at 1.75 and his probability of satiation
is constantly 0.25; all the resource increment goes to agent 2, and agent 2’s probability of
11
00.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Figure 1: The equal-quantile rule with parameter λ = 0.75
satiation increases from 0 to 0.25.12 If T = 6.5, the assignments are t′′1 = 3.5 and t
′′
2 = 3,
since F1(t′′1 ) = F2(t
′′
2 ) = 0.5 < λ and t
′′
1 + t
′′
2 = 6.5. When the endowment exceeds 9.5, the
assignments remain constant at t∗1 = 5.25 and t
∗
2 = 4.25, since F1(t
∗
1) = F2(t
∗
2) = λ and λ is
the maximal probability of satiation imposed by the rule. Thus, the parameter of the rule
determines the maximal assignments of the agents.
To define equal-quantile rules, we introduce, for each claim, a quantile function that
returns for each probability α ∈ (0, 1] an assignment that gives an α probability of satiation
to an agent who has the claim (possibly in an approximate sense as will be elaborated later).
Formally, for each Fi ∈ F , the quantile function QFi : (0, 1] → R is defined by setting,
for each α ∈ (0, 1],
QFi(α) := min{xi ∈ R : Fi(xi) ≥ α}. (1)
Since Fi is right-continuous and non-decreasing, the minimum operator in (1) is well de-
fined. Note that QFi is non-decreasing, QFi((0, 1]) ⊆ [ci,Ci], and lim
α↓0
QFi(α) = ci. Besides,
12When 1.75 × 2 ≤ T < 4, the rule gives the agents different probabilities of satiation, but still, there is a
sense in which their probabilities of satiation are “approximately” the same, as is to be elaborated later.
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since Fi is increasing on its support [ci,Ci], QFi is continuous. If Fi is continuous, QFi is
the inverse function F−1i , returning for each α ∈ (0, 1] the assignment that induces an α
probability of satiation. If Fi is discontinuous at QFi(α) for some α ∈ (0, 1), the assignment
QFi(α) may induce a probability of satiation larger than α. In example 1, when α = 0.2,
agent 1’s probability of satiation given by QF1(α) is 0.25. In this case, α is an “approxi-
mate” probability of satiation in the sense that any smaller assignment induces a probability
of satiation smaller than α, and any larger assignment a probability larger than α.13
Equal-quantile rules: For each λ ∈ (0, 1], let rλ denote the equal-quantile rule with
parameter λ. For each I ∈ N and each (F,T ) ∈ PI , when T ≤ ∑ ci, for each j ∈ I,
rλj (F,T ) := min{c∗, c j}, where c∗ ∈ R+ satisfies
∑
min{c∗, ci} = T ;
when T >
∑
ci, for each j ∈ I,
rλj (F,T ) := QF j(α
∗), where α∗ ∈ (0, λ] satisfies
∑
QFi(α
∗) = min
{
T,
∑
QFi(λ)
}
.
The rule rλ is well defined. When T ≤ ∑ ci, there is a unique c∗ ∈ R+ satisfying∑
min{c∗, ci} = T . When T > ∑ ci, note the following. First, when T ≥ ∑ QFi(λ), the
condition
∑
QFi(α
∗) = min{T,∑ QFi(λ)} is satisfied with α∗ = λ. Second, when T <∑
QFi(λ), since
∑
lim
α↓0
QFi(α) =
∑
ci < T <
∑
QFi(λ) and
∑
QFi is continuous, there is
α∗ ∈ (0, λ) satisfying the condition. Lastly, all values of α∗ satisfying the condition give
rise to the same allocation since quantile functions are non-decreasing.
Each equal-quantile rule sets a parameter λ ∈ (0, 1] to determine the extent to which
agents should be satiated. The maximal assignment to each agent i is QFi(λ). When λ < 1,
in general, agents are never satiated for sure, even if there is enough of the resource.14
Moreover, even if the resource is limited, i.e., even if it falls short of the sum of the agents’
maximal needs, as long as it exceeds the sum of the agents’ maximal assignments, it is not
fully allocated. How to choose the parameter is further addressed in Section 5.
Equal-quantile rules belong to Young (1987a)’s parametric class appropriately extended
to the uncertain context. According to the definition of Long and Xue (2019), each extended
13In Example 1, when T = Q−1F1 (0.2) + Q
−1
F2
(0.2), the rule gives agent 1 an approximately 0.2 probability of
satiation and agent 2 an exactly 0.2 probability of satiation; the probabilities are approximately the same.
14An agent could be satiated for sure when his claim is discontinuous at his maximal need.
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parametric rule determines, in addition to a parametric way of rationing as in the determin-
istic context, a maximal assignment to each agent.15 To be precise, let α, α ∈ R ∪ {−∞,∞}
with α < α, and let f : F × [α, α] → R be such that for each Fi ∈ F , f (Fi, ·) is non-
decreasing and continuous with f (Fi, α) = 0 and f (Fi, α) ≤ Ci. The parametric rule with
f , denoted by r f , is defined by setting for each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each j ∈ I,
r fj (F,T ) := f (F j, α
∗), where α∗ ∈ [α, α] satisfies
∑
f (Fi, α∗) = min
{
T,
∑
f (Fi, α)
}
.
For each λ ∈ (0, 1], define fλ : F × [−1, λ] → R+ by setting for each Fi ∈ F and each
α ∈ [−1, λ],
fλ(Fi, α) :=

min
{
− 1
α
− 1, ci
}
α ∈ [−1, 0]
QFi(α) α ∈ (0, λ]
.
Note that fλ is increasing and continuous in α, fλ(Fi,−1) = 0, and fλ(Fi, λ) = QFi(λ) ≤ Ci.
It can be readily verified that the equal-quantile rule rλ is the parametric rule r fλ .
4 Axiomatic foundation
4.1 Axioms
A basic fairness principle is Aristotle’s “equal treatment of equals”. It requires that agents
who have equal claims receive equal assignments (Thomson (2003)).
Symmetry: For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each pair i, j ∈ I, if Fi = F j, then
ri(F,T ) = r j(F,T ).
A familiar order-preservation principle is that a rule should respect the sizes of agents’
claims: If an agent’s claim is at most as large as another agent’s, then he should receive
at most as much as the other does (Aumann and Maschler (1985), Thomson (2003)). To
compare the sizes of claims in the uncertain context, we adopt the commonly-used FSD
criterion. Formally, for each pair {i, j} ⊆ N and each F ∈ F {i, j}, we say that Fi is no smaller
than F j in the FSD sense, denoted by Fi %FSD F j, if for each c ∈ R, Fi(c) ≤ F j(c).16
15Based on this definition, Long and Xue (2019) extend the results of Young (1987a).
16One may also consider an order-preservation requirement with respect to some other order of stochastic
dominance. For example, a risk-averse planner would assign a no larger amount to an agent whose claim is
riskier in the second-order stochastic dominance sense. This is studied by Xue (2018a).
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Ranking: For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each pair i, j ∈ I, if Fi %FS D F j, then
ri(F,T ) ≥ r j(F,T ).
If two claims are equal, then either of them is no smaller than the other in the FSD
sense. Thus, ranking implies symmetry.
A strict version of ranking requires that if an agent’s claim is larger than another agent’s,
then he receive more than the other does (Young (1988), Thomson (2003)). We formulate
this requirement based on a notion of strict FSD. For each pair {i, j} ⊆ N and each F ∈
F {i, j}, we say that Fi is larger than F j in the strict FSD sense, denoted by Fi FSD F j, if
Fi %FS D F j, and for each c ∈ [c j,C j], Fi(c) < F j(c). That is, agent i’s claim is larger than
agent j’s if agent i’s claim is no smaller than agent j’s, and for each agent j’s possible need
c, the probability that agent i needs more than c is larger than that probability for agent j.
Strict ranking: For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each pair i, j ∈ I, if Fi FS D F j,
then ri(F,T ) > r j(F,T ).
Ranking and strict ranking are not logically related. However, strict ranking, together
with the following continuity requirement, implies ranking (Lemma 2).
The continuity requirement is that small changes in a problem not lead to large changes
in the chosen allocation. It ensures that errors in specifying the data of a problem, or
corrections of these errors, do not radically affect the recommendation (Young (1987a,
1988), Thomson (2003)). The topology that we adopt to evaluate changes in a problem
is based on the following notion of convergence. For each i ∈ N, each Fi ∈ F , and
each sequence {Fni }∞n=1 of elements of F , we say that Fni converges to Fi if Fni converges
weakly to Fi, lim cni = ci, and lim C
n
i = Ci.
17 For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each
sequence {(Fn,T n)}∞n=1 of elements of PI , we say that (Fn,T n) converges to (F,T ), denoted
by (Fn, Tn) → (F, T), if for each i ∈ I, Fni converges to Fi, and lim T n = T .18
Continuity: For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each sequence {(Fn,T n)}∞n=1 of elements
of PI , if (Fn,T n)→ (F,T ), then lim r(Fn,T n) = r(F,T ).
The discontinuity in allocation due to the failure of convergence of the sure needs or the
maximal needs is a feature of a large class of rules under uncertainty and is thus allowed
17This notion of convergence of claims is equivalent to the convergence in a metric that is defined based
on the Le´vy-Prokhorov metric. See Long and Xue (2019).
18This is equivalent to saying that (Fn,T n) converges to (F,T ) in the product topology in the space F I×R+.
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by our continuity. For example, consider two agents. Agent 1 needs 10 for sure. Agent
2’s need can be any amount in [0, 10] equally likely or any amount in (10, 20] equally
likely, with the former event occurring with probability α and the latter 1 − α. Pick any
division method in the deterministic context that assigns positive amounts to those who
have positive claims. Consider any rule that applies such a deterministic method to the
profile of the sure needs whenever the endowment is no more than the sum of the sure
needs. When the endowment is 10, as α goes to 0, agent 2’s sure need jumps from 0 to a
positive amount, and thus, so does his assignment chosen by the rule. Moreover, when the
endowment is 30, as α goes to 1, agent 2’s maximal need jumps from 20 to 10, and thus,
so does his assignment chosen by any rule that satiates agents for sure whenever feasible.
A weaker continuity requirement considers only small changes of the endowment.
Endowment continuity: For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each sequence {(F,T n)}∞n=1
of elements of PI , if lim T n = T , then lim r(F,T n) = r(F,T ).
The next axiom states an invariance principle that has played a central role in resource
allocation with a variable population (Aumann and Maschler (1985), Young (1987a),
Thomson (1988, 2012), Moulin (2000)).19 Imagine that after an allocation has been chosen
for a problem, some agents leave with their assignments. The invariance principle says that
if at this point the situation is re-evaluated from the viewpoint of the remaining agents, then
each of them should still be assigned the same amount as initially (Thomson (2011)).
The issue is how to define the problem faced by the remaining agents, called the reduced
problem. Whereas different definitions arise in different contexts, there is a most natural
one in the context of deterministic claims problems. It is to divide what is left among the
remaining agents who have their initial claims. Since the endowment is required to be fully
allocated in the deterministic context, what is left of the resource is also the sum of the
amounts initially assigned to the remaining agents.
In the uncertain context, a subtlety arises in specifying the amount to be divided among
the remaining agents in the reduced problem. In our model, the endowment is the maximal
amount that a planner may use to satiate agents, and it might be optimal for a planner
to reserve a part of it for some alternative use (see Section 5). Thus, after some agents
19It has also been adopted in various types of models that have rationing structures (see e.g., Moulin and
Sethuraman (2003), Sprumont (2018)). Maschler (1990) and Thomson (2017) provide excellent surveys.
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leave with their assignments, the remainder of the resource may well be different from
the amount assigned in total to the remaining agents. This gives rise to two situations.
First, after the departure of some agents, the reserved resource has been given away to an
alternative use, and thus, the endowment in the reduced problem is the sum of the amounts
initially assigned to the remaining agents. Second, the reserved resource has not been given
away and is still available for the remaining agents, and thus, the amount that they divide
is the difference between the initial endowment and the sum of the assignments to the
agents who leave. Since both ways of specifying the endowment in the reduced problem
are reasonable, we require the invariance principle to hold in both cases.20
Consistency: For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each J ⊆ I, rJ(F,T ) =
r(FJ,
∑
j∈J
r j(F,T )) = r(FJ,T − ∑
j∈I\J
r j(F,T )), where rJ(F,T ) and FJ are, respectively, the
restrictions of r(F,T ) and F onto J.
Different ways of defining the endowment in the reduced problem have also appeared
in some other contexts where consistency is relevant. In the problem of allocating indivisi-
ble goods or “objects” to agents who have unit demands, when there are more objects than
agents, after some agents leave with their assignments, the set of objects assigned to those
who stay is different from that of remaining objects. Depending on whether the unassigned
objects have been disposed of when the reduced problem is defined, the consistency prin-
ciple is formulated as post-disposal consistency or pre-disposal consistency (Ehlers and
Klaus (2006, 2007), Thomson (2017)).21 For economies with production, solutions specify
production plans and allocations of commodity bundles to agents. After some agents leave,
depending on whether production has occurred or not, the options open to those who stay
are either to divide their collective assignments, or to produce and divide the remaining out-
puts after delivering to the agents who leave their assignments. The consistency principle
is formulated as post-production consistency and pre-production consistency, respectively,
in the two scenarios (Thomson (1998)).
The last axiom is also an invariance property. Roughly, it requires that in a “trans-
formed problem”, all agents receive their “transformed assignments”. Imagine that there is
a production technology converting the resource into some output. An agent’s (uncertain)
20Part of Theorem 1 holds with the invariance requirement imposed only in the first case. See footnote 23.
21Ehlers and Klaus (2006, 2007) call the two axioms reallocation consistency and consistency, respectively.
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claim on the resource comes from his (uncertain) need for the output. Our axiom pertains
to the possibility that after an allocation has been chosen for a problem, due to a common
technology shock, to produce designated quantities of the output, different amounts of the
resource are required. Then each agent’s need for the output is transformed into a new claim
on the resource. Assume that the endowment is also revised so that agents’ needs for the
output can be met in the initial way, i.e., the new endowment is obtained by first applying
the same transformation to each agent’s initial assignment and then summing up the trans-
formed assignments. In this case, agents should receive their transformed assignments and
have their needs met as initially. In other words, the division principle should depend only
on agents’ ultimate needs for output, and allocations should be calculated without know-
ing the underlying production technology. The familiar scale invariance axiom requires
the same thing when the transformation is a scalar multiplication (Moulin (1987, 2000),
Young (1988), Marchant (2008)). Our axiom requires the invariance for all increasing and
continuous transformations, and thus, is stronger than scale invariance.
Formally, a transformation is a function from R+ to R+. Let Φ be the set of all in-
creasing and continuous transformations. For each i ∈ N, each Fi ∈ F , and each φ ∈ Φ, let
Fφi denote the claim in F defined by setting for each xi ∈ R,
Fφi (xi) :=

0 xi ∈ (−∞, φ(0))
Fi(φ−1(xi)) xi ∈ φ([0,∞))
1 xi ∈ [ lim
x→∞ φ(x),∞)
.
In other words, each need xi ∈ R+ is transformed to a new need φ(xi), so that Fφi (φ(xi)) =
Fi(xi). For each I ∈ N , each F ∈ F I , and each φ ∈ Φ, let Fφ denote the transformed claim
profile in F I , namely, for each i ∈ I, (Fφ)i = Fφi .
Ordinality: For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , each φ ∈ Φ, and each i ∈ I,
ri(Fφ,
∑
φ(r j(F,T ))) = φ(ri(F,T )).
The invariance of the choice of a social alternative with respect to increasing trans-
formations of individual characteristics has been well studied in various contexts. In the
deterministic claims problems, besides scale invariance, there are invariance requirements
related to different transformations of agents’ claims and endowment (Marchant (2008)).
In the problem of aggregating individual utilities into a social utility, ordinal covariance
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requires the social utility of transformed individual utilities to be the same as the trans-
formed social utility of the initial individual utilities (Chambers (2007, 2009)).22 In the cost
sharing problem, a version of ordinality requires cost shares to be invariant under increas-
ing transformations of the scales in which individual demands are measured (Sprumont
(1998)). This ordinality is stronger than ours in that transformations can be agent-specific.
In the axiomatic bargaining problem, solutions are required to be invariant under common
increasing transformations of individual utility representations that preserve preference or-
derings and interpersonal comparisons (Nielsen (1983)). A stronger requirement related
to agent-specific transformations is considered by Shapley (1967) and Roth (1979). In so-
cial choice theory, analogous requirements are also considered for social welfare orderings
(d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977), Gevers (1979)).
Despite its relevance, ordinality is a strong requirement. It restricts our applications
to environments where agents are subject to common technology shocks. In particular,
when agents use the resource for different purposes, they are typically subject to different
technology shocks, and our arguments for ordinality would not be valid.
4.2 Characterization
As discussed in the Introduction, there are two important questions regarding resource al-
location with uncertain needs. The first is how much of a resource should be used to satiate
agents. Surprisingly, a combination of standard axioms, when extended to the uncertain
context, provides a guideline on assessing the extent to which a resource should be used
to satiate agents. Our first result says that a planner, who agrees with the axioms, should
impose on each agent a maximal assignment that depends on his claim, fully allocate a
resource whenever it falls short of the sum of the maximal assignments, and otherwise,
simply give each agent his maximal assignment.
Theorem 1. Let r be symmetric, endowment continuous, and consistent. There is M :
F → R+ such that for each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each i ∈ I, (1) T < ∑ M(F j) ⇒∑
r j(F,T ) = T and ri(F,T ) ≤ M(Fi), and (2) T ≥ ∑ M(F j)⇒ ri(F,T ) = M(Fi).23
22Chambers (2009) studies functions defined on the space of CDFs. His ordinal covariance requires a
function to be invariant under increasing and continuous transformations of CDFs. See Section 1.1.
23Statement (1) holds with a weaker consistency requirement imposed only in the case where the collective
assignment of the remaining agents is divided among themselves. It is the proof of statement (2) that invokes
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It is under our weaker feasibility constraint that the implications of these axioms are
uncovered. In the deterministic claims problems, the resource that never exceeds the sum
of the agents’ claims is always required to be fully allocated. As a result, each agent’s
maximal assignment is trivially his (deterministic) claim.
When strict ranking and ordinality are further imposed, a specific way of determining
agents’ maximal assignments stands out and the class of equal-quantile rules emerges.24
Theorem 2. A rule satisfies strict ranking, continuity, consistency, and ordinality if and
only if it is an equal-quantile rule.25
Theorem 2 provides a more specific solution to the question regarding the extent to
which a resource should be used to satiate agents. It says that a planner, who agrees with the
axioms, should set a common maximal probability of satiation λ, fully allocate a resource
if it falls short of the sum of the agents’ λ-quantile assignments, and otherwise, give each
agent exactly his λ-quantile assignment. In Section 5, we provide welfare interpretations
of λ, which further suggest that the choice of λ depends on some information outside the
data of a problem. In particular, the planner should explore the uses of the resource outside
the model, or equivalently, evaluate the cost of generating waste relative to deficit.
The second question is how the concerns for waste and deficit should be balanced across
agents with different claims. While the axioms, originating in the deterministic fair division
literature, have nothing to do with waste or balance, they surprisingly characterize a class
of rules that achieves such a balance in a reasonable way. This will be explicitly seen in
Section 5, where we show that each equal-quantile rule minimizes a social cost function
that aggregates the costs of waste and deficit.
The characterization is tight. Dropping strict ranking, a sequential priority rule that
gives a higher priority to an agent labeled by a larger integer satisfies continuity, consis-
tency, and ordinality. The rule first satiates the agent labeled by the largest integer for
sure, if feasible; if not, it assigns the entire endowment to him. Then it satiates the agent
labeled by the second largest integer for sure, if feasible; if not, it assigns all the remaining
endowment to him; so on and so forth, until either all agents are satiated for sure or the
endowment is fully allocated.
our stronger notion of consistency.
24Symmetry becomes redundant in this case.
25The proof of Theorem 2 does not use the full power of ordinality. Only two special types of transforma-
tions are involved. See Appendix A.2.1 for the details of such transformations.
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Dropping continuity, a rule that favors agents who have larger maximal needs satisfies
strict ranking, consistency, and ordinality. The rule first satiates the agents who have the
largest maximal need for sure, if feasible; if not, it divides the endowment equally among
them. Then it satiates the agents who have the second largest maximal need for sure, if
feasible; if not, it divides all the remaining endowment equally among them; so on and so
forth, until either all agents are satiated for sure or the endowment is fully allocated.
Dropping consistency, consider an equal-quantile rule relating to some λ ∈ (0, 1] for
two-agent problems and a different λ′ ∈ (0, 1] for the other problems. Such a rule satisfies
strict ranking, continuity, and ordinality.
Dropping ordinality, a version of the proportional rule satisfies strict ranking, conti-
nuity, and consistency. When the endowment exceeds the sum of the agents’ maximal
needs, each agent is assigned his maximal need. Otherwise, the rule fully allocates the
endowment by applying a “constrained proportional method” to the profile of the expected
claims. Precisely, each agent is assigned either his maximal need or c times his expected
claim, whichever is smaller, where c ≥ 0 is determined by the binding feasibility constraint.
5 Optimality
One central principle in social choice theory is that collective decisions should be made
in accordance with the optimization of an ordering over alternatives. An application of
this principle in fair division problems is that the recommended allocations should be those
maximizing some collective measure of “welfare” or minimizing some collective measure
of “cost”. In the deterministic claims problems, each parametric rule minimizes a social
cost function (Young (1987a)).26 In the uncertain context, the optimality of parametric
rules remains true (Long and Xue (2019)).
The difficulty with the optimization approach lies in choosing an appropriate measure
of welfare or cost (Young (1987a)). While each parametric rule can be rationalized by
many objectives, our contribution here is to discover, for equal-quantile rules, two rele-
vant measures that explicitly show how the rules respond to the two important questions
regarding resource allocation under uncertainty raised in the Introduction.27
26The same result is obtained by Stovall (2014) for asymmetric parametric rules.
27Our optimality result is not implied by Long and Xue (2019). The cost function that they construct is
strictly convex, and thus, admits a unique optimal allocation. Ours is not strictly convex and there is more
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Each equal-quantile rule maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function. To define the
function, imagine that each agent, after his need is realized, obtains a constant marginal
utility of u > 0 from each unit of the assigned resource that he needs, and zero utility
from the redundant resource that exceeds his need, if any. Thus, if agent i is assigned ti
when he needs xi, he obtains utility u · min{xi, ti}. Note that u is the same across agents.
This is typically the case when agents are of the same type, as in the applications in the
Introduction. For example, in the case of a government’s budget allocation, the utility of a
local authority usually depends on the number of citizens served by its public facility, and
a marginal increase in the number yields a constant and common marginal utility for all
local authorities.28
Besides the agents in the model, imagine another agent outside the model that can
make alternative use of the resource. In each problem, after an allocation is chosen, all
the leftover resource is directed to the alternative use. This outside agent can “absorb” any
amount of the leftover and obtain a constant marginal utility v ∈ [0, u) from each unit of
it.29 Thus, if an allocation t is chosen for a problem (F,T ), the outside agent obtains utility
v · (T − ∑ ti). For example, an emergency management organization can assign its rescue
personnel to a non-emergency activity (e.g., educational activity) that has a lower priority
than emergency rescue. This is a valuable use of the rescue personnel if there turns out
to be no emergency.30 Alternatively, the outside agent could be the option of saving the
resource for future use, which yields a discounted marginal utility.
Let I ∈ N and (F,T ) ∈ PI . We abuse notation and denote by F a joint distribution
of agents’ needs whose marginal distributions are their claims. The choice of such a joint
distribution can be arbitrary since our result depends only on marginal distributions.
A utilitarian planner, someone who cares only about the sum of individual utilities,
than one optimal allocations when the endowment is positive and no more than the sum of the sure needs.
28Similarly, in the case of emergency management, the utility of an assistance center usually depends on
the number of lives saved by its rescue force, and an marginal increase in the number yields a constant and
common marginal utility for all assistance centers. In the case of an institute’s grant allocation, it is also
arguable that the utility of a department is in proportion to the number of participants in its research activity.
29This does not necessarily mean that the outside agent surely needs the resource. Our analysis accommo-
dates the case that v is a constant expected marginal utility.
30A government can allocate a budget to an alternative project (e.g., expanding government office space)
that has a lower priority than building a public facility. This is beneficial if there turns out to be insufficient
demand for the public facility. A similar example can be found in the case of an institute’s grant allocation.
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chooses an allocation t to maximize∫ [∑
u min{xi, ti} + v(T −
∑
ti)
]
dF. (2)
The expected sum of individual utilities is equal to the sum of expected individual utilities∑∫
u min{xi, ti}dFi + v(T −
∑
ti),
which depends only on marginal distributions.31
Proposition 1. Let u, v ∈ R+ and λ ∈ (0, 1] be such that u > v and λ = u−vu . For each I ∈ N
and each (F,T ) ∈ PI , rλ(F,T ) maximizes the utilitarian social welfare function (2).
To see that rλ(F,T ) maximizes (2) when λ = u−vu , assume for simplicity that the Fi’s are
continuous. For each i ∈ I, the partial derivative of (2) with respect to ti is
u(1 − Fi(ti)) − v. (3)
Intuitively, a marginal increase in agent i’s assignment ti benefits agent i only when he
needs more than ti, which occurs with probability 1−Fi(ti). Thus, the benefit of a marginal
increase in ti is the expected marginal increase in agent i’s utility, which is u(1 − Fi(ti)).
Moreover, the cost is the definite marginal loss in the outside agent’s utility, which is v. For
each i ∈ I, the partial derivative (3) is non-increasing in ti, and (3) is equal to zero when
ti = F−1i (
u−v
u ). Thus, when the endowment is sufficiently large, i.e., when T ≥
∑
F−1i (
u−v
u ),
it is optimal to assign to each agent i an amount equal to F−1i (
u−v
u ). When the endowment
is limited, i.e., when T <
∑
F−1i (
u−v
u ), an allocation is optimal if and only if the endowment
is fully allocated and the agents’ probabilities of satiation, the Fi(ti)’s, are equalized.32
Proposition 1 provides a welfare interpretation of λ. It is the optimal upper bound
on agents’ probabilities of satiation with respect to the social welfare function (2) and it
depends on the ratio of v to u. As the ratio gets smaller, allocating more of the resource to
31The sum over the population and the expectation over uncertainty are interchangeable since the integrand
in (2) is additively separable across agents (Fishburn (1970) and Al-Najjar and Pomatto (2016)). The inter-
changeability of the sum and the expectation does not depend on the linearity of individual utilities. It holds
for each utilitarian social welfare function with general individual utilities.
32When T <
∑
ci, all allocations that fully use the resource and assign no agent more than his sure need
are optimal, since they give all agents the same (zero) probability of satiation; the constrained equal awards
allocation chosen by equal-quantile rules is one of them. When T ≥ ∑ ci, the optimal allocation is unique.
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the agents in the model would result in an increase in their expected utilities that exceeds
the concurrent decrease in the outside agent’s utility. Thus, allowing a larger maximal
probability of satiation improves the social welfare. When v = 0, it is optimal to fully use
the resource within the model, no matter how uncertain their needs are, and the optimal
maximal probability of satiation is 1. When v approaches u, it becomes optimal to satisfy
only the sure needs of the agents in the model, no matter how large their maximal needs
are, and the optimal maximal probability of satiation approaches 0.
Bringing the outside agent into the picture is the key to understanding the first question
on the extent to which a resource should be used in the model.33 In fact, it would be ideal
to include the information of the outside agent into the data of a problem. But it may
often be the case that an economist is only given the information on agents’ claims and a
budget limit and is asked to recommend an allocation. Theorem 2 shows that even without
complete information, a specific class of rules can be recommended based on four axioms;
and to choose one rule from this class, Proposition 1 further suggests that the planner
explore the information on alternative uses of the resource outside the model.
Moreover, an equivalent cost-minimization objective provides an explicit answer to the
second question on how to balance the concerns for waste and deficit across agents: Each
equal-quantile rule balances the trade-offs by minimizing a utilitarian social cost function
which linearly depends on the expected waste and deficit of agents. Formally, given a unit
waste cost cw ≥ 0 and a unit deficit cost cd > 0, the social cost at an allocation t is
cw
∑∫
xi<ti
(ti − xi)dFi + cd
∑∫
xi>ti
(xi − ti)dFi. (4)
Proposition 2. Let cw ≥ 0, cd > 0, and λ ∈ (0, 1] be such that λ = cdcw+cd . For each I ∈ N
and each (F,T ) ∈ PI , rλ(F,T ) minimizes the utilitarian social cost function (4).
When cw = v and cd = u − v, maximizing the social welfare (2) is equivalent to mini-
mizing the social cost (4), since it can be shown that (4) is essentially the opportunity cost
generated by an allocation under uncertainty.34 Intuitively, the marginal opportunity cost of
waste is the utility that could have been obtained by the outside agent had a unit wasted by
33Considering such an outside agent is also consistent with the assumption of full resource allocation in
the deterministic context. When the agents in the model have deterministic satiation points, the outside agent
loses his advantage, and it is optimal to fully use the resource within the model.
34See Appendix A.3.1 for more details about the opportunity cost.
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an agent in the model been assigned to him. Thus, cw = v. The marginal opportunity cost
of deficit is the additional utility that could have been experienced by an unsatiated agent in
the model had a unit been assigned to him instead of to the outside agent. Thus, cd = u− v.
Proposition 2 provides an equivalent welfare interpretation of λ. It is the optimal max-
imal probability of satiation with respect to the social cost function (4). The ratio of cw
to cd, reflecting how to balance between waste and deficit, determines λ. As waste gets
less costly relative to deficit, allowing a larger maximal probability of satiation reduces the
social cost. Thus, in addition to providing an answer to the second question, Proposition 2
also suggests, in response to the first question, that to pick one rule from the equal-quantile
class, equivalently, a planner should investigate the cost of waste relative to deficit.
Note that a utilitarian planner always gives a priority to sure needs. For example, 100
units of a resource are to be divided between two agents. The sure need of each agent is 50,
while the maximal need of one agent is 200 and that of the other is 51. All equal-quantile
rules assign 50 to each agent, ignoring the difference of their maximal needs. This would
not be desirable, say, if a planner aims to maximize the number of agents who have their
maximal needs satisfied. But still, utilitarianism is long-standing welfare criterion and there
are situations where it is relevant. For example, an emergency management agency should
arguably give priority to the assistance centers that surely need the rescue resource.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study resource allocation with uncertain needs. We address two questions.
To what extent should a resource be used to satiate agents? How should the trade-offs
between waste and deficit be balanced across agents? We introduce the class of equal-
quantile rules, provide an axiomatic justification, and show that each equal-quantile rule
is optimal with respect to two utilitarian objectives. An equal-quantile rule determines the
extent to which a resource should be used by setting a common maximal probability of
satiation. It balances the trade-offs between waste and deficit across agents by minimizing
a utilitarian social cost function that linearly aggregates the costs of waste and deficit.
One important open question is how to allocate a resource when agents’ needs are
correlated. In the end of Section 2, we provide three scenarios where it is reasonable
to focus on individual claims, i.e., marginal distributions. However, there are also good
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reasons to challenge our objective functions and axioms when agents’ needs are correlated.
For example, a dollar is to be divided among three agents, 1, 2, and 3, whose needs de-
pend on two states, “sunny” and “rainy”. Each state occurs with probability 12 . When sunny,
both agents 1 and 2 need a dollar, and agent 3 needs zero. When rainy, both agents 1 and 2
need zero, and agent 3 needs a dollar. Thus, all agents claim zero and a dollar with equal
probabilities. Our symmetry requires the agents to be assigned the same amount. Imagine
that each agent obtains a marginal utility of u > 0 from each unit of money assigned to him
if he needs it, and a marginal utility of 0 if he does not. Consider the allocations t = ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 )
and t′ = ( 14 ,
1
4 ,
1
2 ). Aggregate utility at t is
1
3u+
1
3u =
2
3u when sunny, and
1
3u when rainy, and
at t′ is 14u+
1
4u =
1
2u when sunny, and
1
2u when rainy. Although the two allocations yield the
same aggregate utility in expectation, the variance of the utilities is greater at t than at t′.
A risk averse planner would choose t′ over t, violating symmetry. Indeed, two agents with
equal claims may not have the same need in each state, so that they should not necessarily
be treated equally. To accommodate the planner’s choice of t′, one would invoke a weaker
version of symmetry, or a social welfare function that imposes a concave transformation
on aggregate utility before taking the expectation over states. This example suggests that
resource allocation based on joint distributions of needs deserves further investigation.
A Appendix
Given I, I′ ∈ N , F ∈ F I , and F′ ∈ F I′ with I ∩ I′ = ∅, let (F, F′) denote the claim profile
in F I∪I′ defined by setting for each i ∈ I, agent i’s claim Fi, and for each j ∈ I′, agent j’s
claim F′j.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Let r be a symmetric, endowment continuous, and consistent rule. For each i ∈ N and each
Fi ∈ F , let t∗Fi := sup{r(Fi,T ) : T ∈ R+}. It is readily seen that t∗Fi ∈ [0,Ci]. We will show
that for each i ∈ I and each Fi ∈ F , t∗Fi depends only on an agent’s claim, not his label.
Moreover, define M : F → R+ by setting for each Fi ∈ F , M(Fi) := t∗Fi . We will show that
the function M satisfies the two conditions stated in the theorem.
Step 1: Full use of sufficiently small resources in single-agent problems. In each single-
agent problem, the resource is full allocated as long as it does not exceed the agent’s maxi-
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mal assignment. Formally, for each i ∈ N, each Fi ∈ F , and each T ∈ [0, t∗Fi], r(Fi,T ) = T .
Let i ∈ N, Fi ∈ F , and T ∈ [0, t∗Fi]. We first show that r(Fi, t∗Fi) = t∗Fi . By the
definition of t∗Fi , there is a sequence {T n}∞n=1 of elements of R+ such that lim r(Fi,T n) = t∗Fi .
By consistency, for each n ∈ N, r(Fi, r(Fi,T n)) = r(Fi,T n). Then lim r(Fi, r(Fi,T n)) =
lim r(Fi,T n) = t∗Fi . By endowment continuity, r(Fi, lim r(Fi,T
n)) = lim r(Fi, r(Fi,T n)).
Thus, r(Fi, t∗Fi) = r(Fi, lim r(Fi,T
n)) = lim r(Fi, r(Fi,T n)) = t∗Fi .
Since r(Fi, 0) = 0, r(Fi, t∗Fi) = t
∗
Fi , and T ∈ [0, t∗Fi], by endowment continuity, there is
T ′ ∈ [0, t∗Fi] such that r(Fi,T ′) = T . Then by consistency, r(Fi,T ) = T .
Step 2: Maximal assignments and full use of sufficiently small resources in multi-
agent problems. The maximal assignment to an agent in a problem depends only on the
agent and his claim. Moreover, in each multi-agent problem, the resource is full allocated
as long as it does not exceed the sum of the agents’ maximal assignments. Formally, for
each I ∈ N and each (F,T ) ∈ PI , (1) for each i ∈ I, ri(F,T ) ≤ t∗Fi , (2) when T ≤
∑
t∗Fi ,∑
ri(F,T ) = T , and thus (3) for each i ∈ I, ri(F,∑ t∗F j) = t∗Fi .
Let I ∈ N and (F,T ) ∈ PI . For each i ∈ I, by consistency and the definition of t∗Fi ,
ri(F,T ) = r(Fi, ri(F,T )) ≤ t∗Fi . Hence, (1) holds.
Let T ∗ := sup{∑ ri(F,T ′) : T ′ ∈ R+}. By (1), for each T ′ ∈ R+, ∑ ri(F,T ′) ≤ ∑ t∗Fi ,
and thus T ∗ ∈ [0,∑ t∗Fi]. To show (2), we first show that ∑ ri(F,T ∗) = T ∗. By the defini-
tion of T ∗, there is a sequence {T n}∞n=1 of elements of R+ such that lim
∑
ri(F,T n) = T ∗.
By consistency, for each n ∈ N, r(F,T n) = r(F,∑ ri(F,T n)). By endowment continu-
ity, r(F, lim
∑
ri(F,T n)) = lim r(F,
∑
ri(F,T n)). Thus, r(F,T ∗) = r(F, lim
∑
ri(F,T n)) =
lim r(F,
∑
ri(F,T n)) = lim r(F,T n). Hence,
∑
ri(F,T ∗) = lim
∑
ri(F,T n) = T ∗.
Next, we show that
∑
t∗Fi = T
∗. Suppose to the contrary that
∑
t∗Fi , T
∗. Since T ∗ ∈
[0,
∑
t∗Fi] and
∑
t∗Fi , T
∗, T ∗ <
∑
t∗Fi . Since
∑
ri(F,T ∗) = T ∗ <
∑
t∗Fi , there is j ∈ I such that
T ∗ − ∑
i∈I\{ j}
ri(F,T ∗) = r j(F,T ∗) < t∗F j . By endowment continuity, there is T
′ ∈ (T ∗,∞) such
that T ′− ∑
i∈I\{ j}
ri(F,T ′) < t∗F j . Then by Step 1, r(F j,T
′− ∑
i∈I\{ j}
ri(F,T ′)) = T ′− ∑
i∈I\{ j}
ri(F,T ′).
By consistency, r j(F,T ′) = r(F j,T ′ − ∑
i∈I\{ j}
ri(F,T ′)). Thus, r j(F,T ′) = T ′ − ∑
i∈I\{ j}
ri(F,T ′).
Hence,
∑
ri(F,T ′) = T ′ > T ∗. However, by the definition of T ∗, T ∗ ≥ ∑ ri(F,T ′), which
contradicts the inequality
∑
ri(F,T ′) > T ∗.
Now suppose that T ≤ ∑ t∗Fi . Since ∑ ri(F,T ∗) = T ∗ and ∑ t∗Fi = T ∗, ∑ ri(F,∑ t∗Fi) =∑
t∗Fi . Since
∑
ri(F, 0) = 0,
∑
ri(F,
∑
t∗Fi) =
∑
t∗Fi , and T ∈ [0,
∑
t∗Fi], by endowment
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continuity, there is T ′ ∈ [0,∑ t∗Fi] such that ∑ ri(F,T ′) = T . By consistency, r(F,T ′) =
r(F,
∑
ri(F,T ′)). Then r(F,T ′) = r(F,T ), and thus
∑
ri(F,T ) =
∑
ri(F,T ′) = T . Hence, (2)
holds.
Lastly, it is readily seen that (3) follows from (1) and (2).
Step 3: Anonymity of maximal assignments. The maximal assignment to an agent in a
problem depends only on the agent’s claim, not his label. Formally, for each pair i, j ∈ N
and each pair Fi, F j ∈ F such that Fi = F j, t∗Fi = t∗F j .
Let i, j ∈ N and Fi, F j ∈ F be such that Fi = F j. By Step 2, r((Fi, F j), t∗Fi + t∗F j) =
(t∗Fi , t
∗
F j). By symmetry, t
∗
Fi = t
∗
F j .
Step 4: Constant assignment in single-agent problems with sufficiently large re-
sources. In each single-agent problem, the agent always receives his maximal assignment
when the resource exceeds his maximal assignment. Formally, for each i ∈ N, each Fi ∈ F ,
and each T ∈ (t∗Fi ,∞), r(Fi,T ) = t∗Fi .
Let i ∈ N, Fi ∈ F , T ∈ (t∗Fi ,∞), and ti := r(Fi,T ). By the definition of t∗Fi , ti ≤ t∗Fi . To
show that ti = t∗Fi , suppose to the contrary that ti < t
∗
Fi .
Let I ∈ N be such that i < I and |I|(t∗Fi − ti) + t∗Fi > T . Let F ∈ F I be such that for each
j ∈ I, F j = Fi. Define f : [(|I| + 1)t∗Fi ,∞)→ R+ by setting for each T ′ ∈ [(|I| + 1)t∗Fi ,∞),
f (T ′) := T ′ − |I|ri((Fi, F),T ′).
For each T ′ ∈ R+, by symmetry, ∑
j∈I
r j((Fi, F),T ′) = |I|ri((Fi, F),T ′), and thus by consis-
tency,
ri((Fi, F),T ′) = r(Fi, f (T ′)). (5)
We claim that there is T ′′ ∈ [(|I| + 1)t∗Fi ,∞) such that f (T ′′) = T . To see this, note first
that for each j ∈ I, since F j = Fi, by Step 3, t∗F j = t∗Fi . Thus, by Step 2, ri((Fi, F), (|I| +
1)t∗Fi) = t
∗
Fi . Hence, f ((|I| + 1)t∗Fi) = (|I| + 1)t∗Fi − |I|t∗Fi = t∗Fi < T . Moreover, by Step 2,
ri((Fi, F),T + |I|t∗Fi) ≤ t∗Fi . Hence, f (T + |I|t∗Fi) ≥ T + |I|t∗Fi − |I|t∗Fi = T . By endowment
continuity, f is continuous. Since f ((|I| + 1)t∗Fi) < T ≤ f (T + |I|t∗Fi) and f is continuous,
there is T ′′ ∈ [(|I| + 1)t∗Fi ,T + |I|t∗Fi] such that f (T ′′) = T .
By (5), ri((Fi, F),T ′′) = r(Fi, f (T ′′)). Since f (T ′′) = T and r(Fi,T ) = ti, r(Fi, f (T ′′)) =
ti. Thus, ri((Fi, F),T ′′) = ti. Since T ′′ ∈ [(|I| + 1)t∗Fi ,∞) and ri((Fi, F),T ′′) = ti, f (T ′′) =
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T ′′−|I|ri((Fi, F),T ′′) ≥ (|I|+1)t∗Fi−|I|ti = |I|(t∗Fi−ti)+t∗Fi . By the choice of I, |I|(t∗Fi−ti)+t∗Fi >
T . Thus, f (T ′′) > T , which contradicts f (T ′′) = T .
Step 5: Constant assignment in multi-agent problems with sufficiently large resources.
In each multi-agent problem, the agents always receive their maximal assignments when
the resource exceeds the sum of their maximal assignments. Formally, for each I ∈ N ,
each (F,T ) ∈ PI such that T > ∑ t∗F j , and each i ∈ I, ri(F,T ) = t∗Fi .
Let I ∈ N and (F,T ) ∈ PI be such that T > ∑ t∗F j . Let i ∈ I. By consistency,
ri(F,T ) = r(Fi,T − ∑
j∈I\{i}
r j(F,T )). For each j ∈ I, by Step 2, r j(F,T ) ≤ t∗F j . Then T −∑
j∈I\{i}
r j(F,T ) >
∑
t∗F j −
∑
j∈I\{i}
t∗F j = t
∗
Fi . Thus, by Step 4, r(Fi,T −
∑
j∈I\{i}
r j(F,T )) = t∗Fi . Hence,
ri(F,T ) = t∗Fi .
A.2 Characterization of equal-quantile rules
A.2.1 Additional axioms
Anonymity: For each I ∈ N and each pi : I → N that is injective, if (F,T ) ∈ PI and
(F′,T ) ∈ Ppi(I) are such that for each i ∈ I, Fi = F′pi(i), then for each i ∈ I, ri(F,T ) =
rpi(i)(F′,T ).
Endowment monotonicity: For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each T ′ ∈ (T,∞),
r(F,T ) ≤ r(F,T ′).
The above axioms are familiar. The next two axioms weaken ordinality by imposing
different types of restrictions on the admissible transformations. Specifically, consider two
types of piecewise linear transformations. We call φ ∈ Φ an upper transformation if there
are d1, d2, d3, d4 ∈ R+ satisfying d1 < d2 ≤ d3 < d4 and such that for each xi ∈ R+,
φ(xi) =

xi xi ∈ [0, d1) ∪ [d4,∞)
d1 +
d3−d1
d2−d1 (xi − d1) xi ∈ [d1, d2)
d4 − d4−d3d4−d2 (d4 − xi) xi ∈ [d2, d4)
. (6)
That is, φ expands the interval [d1, d2] to [d1, d3], squeezes [d2, d4] to [d3, d4], and leaving
xi unchanged outside [d1, d4]. Figure 2 shows an example of an upper transformation and
the correspondingly transformed claim. Let Φu denote the set of upper transformations.
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Figure 2: Upper transformation and transformed claim
Upper ordinality: For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , each φ ∈ Φu, and each i ∈ I,
ri(Fφ,
∑
φ(r j(F,T ))) = φ(ri(F,T )).
Analogously, we call φ ∈ Φ a lower transformation if there are d1, d2, d3, d4 ∈ R+
satisfying d1 < d2 < d3 < d4 and such that for each xi ∈ R+,
φ(xi) =

xi xi ∈ [0, d1) ∪ [d4,∞)
d1 + d2−d1d3−d1 (xi − d1) xi ∈ [d1, d3)
d4 − d4−d2d4−d3 (d4 − xi) xi ∈ [d3, d4)
. (7)
That is, φ squeezes [d1, d3] to [d1, d2], expands [d3, d4] to [d2, d4], and leaving xi unchanged
outside [d1, d4]. Figure 3 shows an example of an upper transformation and the correspond-
ingly transformed claim. Let Φl denote the set of lower transformations.
Lower ordinality: For each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , each φ ∈ Φl, and each i ∈ I,
ri(Fφ,
∑
φ(r j(F,T ))) = φ(ri(F,T )).
A.2.2 Lemmata
Lemma 1. If a rule is symmetric, endowment continuous, and consistent, then it is anony-
mous.35
35The proof of our Lemma 1 is similar to that of Lemma 3 of Chambers and Thomson (2002). The
difference is that we allow the resource to be partially allocated and divide the proof into two cases depending
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Figure 3: Lower transformation and transformed claim
Proof. Let r be a rule that is symmetric, endowment continuous, and consistent. By The-
orem 1, there is a function M : F → R+ such that for each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI ,
and each i ∈ I, (1) T < ∑ M(F j) ⇒ ∑ r j(F,T ) = T and ri(F,T ) ≤ M(Fi), and (2)
T ≥ ∑ M(F j)⇒ ri(F,T ) = M(Fi).
Let I ∈ N and pi : I → N be such that pi is injective. Let (F,T ) ∈ PI and (F′,T ) ∈ Ppi(I)
be such that for each i ∈ I, Fi = F′pi(i). We want to show that for each i ∈ I, ri(F,T ) =
rpi(i)(F′,T ). For each i ∈ I, since Fi = F′pi(i), M(Fi) = M(F′pi(i)). Thus,
∑
M(Fi) =
∑
M(F′pi(i)).
Assume that T ≥ ∑ M(Fi). Then T ≥ ∑ M(F′pi(i)). Thus, for each i ∈ I, ri(F,T ) = M(Fi)
and rpi(i)(F′,T ) = M(F′pi(i)). Hence, for each i ∈ I, ri(F,T ) = M(Fi) = M(F′pi(i)) = rpi(i)(F′,T ).
Assume that T <
∑
M(Fi). Then T <
∑
M(F′pi(i)). Suppose first that pi(I) ∩ I = ∅.
Let t := r((F, F′), 2T ). Since 2T <
∑
M(Fi) +
∑
M(F′pi(i)),
∑
ti +
∑
tpi(i) = 2T . For each
i ∈ I, since Fi = F′pi(i), by symmetry, ti = tpi(i). Thus,
∑
ti =
∑
tpi(i) = T . Then by
consistency, for each i ∈ I, ti = ri(F,T ) and tpi(i) = rpi(i)(F′,T ). Hence, for each i ∈ I,
ri(F,T ) = ti = tpi(i) = rpi(i)(F′,T ). Suppose now that pi(I) ∩ I , ∅. Let pi′ : I → N be an
injective function such that pi′(I) ∩ I = pi′(I) ∩ pi(I) = ∅. Let F′′ ∈ F pi′(I) be such that for
each i ∈ I, Fi = F′′pi′(i), and thus F′pi(i) = F′′pi′(i). By the previous arguments, for each i ∈ I,
ri(F,T ) = rpi′(i)(F′′,T ) = rpi(i)(F′,T ).
Lemma 2. If a rule satisfies strict ranking and continuity, then it satisfies ranking.
on whether the resource is fully allocated or not. To do that, we impose endowment continuous in addition
and invoke Theorem 1 to understand when the resource is fully allocated.
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Proof. Let r be a rule satisfying strict ranking and continuity. Let I ∈ N , (F,T ) ∈ PI , and
{i, j} ⊆ I be such that Fi %FS D F j. We want to show that ri(F,T ) ≥ r j(F,T ). Suppose that
Fi(0) = 1. Since Fi %FS D F j, Fi(0) ≤ F j(0). Thus, F j(0) = 1. Since both agents have zero
claim, by the definition of a rule, ri(F,T ) = r j(F,T ) = 0.
Suppose that Fi(0) < 1. If F j(0) = 1, then c j = C j = 0 and Fi(0) < F j(0). Thus,
Fi FS D F j. Hence, by strict ranking, ri(F,T ) > r j(F,T ), as desired. Suppose that F j(0) <
1. We divide the proof into two cases and define, in each case, a sequence {Fnj }∞n=1 of
elements of F such that {Fnj }∞n=1 converges to F j and for each n ∈ N, Fi FS D Fnj .
Case 1: F j is a deterministic claim, i.e., c j = C j. Since F j(0) < 1, C j > 0. For each
n ∈ N, let Fnj ∈ F be a deterministic claim of n−1n C j. It is readily verified that {Fnj }∞n=1
converges to F j. For each n ∈ N, since C j > 0, cnj = Cnj < C j = c j. Thus, for each n ∈ N,
for each c ∈ R, Fnj (c) ≥ F j(c) ≥ Fi(c), and for c = cnj = Cnj , Fnj (c) > F j(c) ≥ Fi(c). Hence,
for each n ∈ N, Fi FS D Fnj .
Case 2: F j is not a deterministic claim, i.e., c j < C j. For each n ∈ N, define Fnj ∈ F by
setting for each x j ∈ R,
Fnj (x j) =

0 x j ∈ (−∞, c j)
1
n + (1 − 1n )F j(x j) x j ∈ [c j, 1nc j + n−1n C j)
1 x j ∈ [ 1nc j + n−1n C j,∞)
.
It is readily seen that {Fnj }∞n=1 converges to F j. For each n ∈ N, since c j < C j, for each
x j ∈ [c j, 1nc j+ n−1n C j), F j(x j) < 1, and then [cnj ,Cnj ] = [c j, 1nc j+ n−1n C j]. Thus, for each n ∈ N,
for each c ∈ (−∞, cnj), Fnj (c) = F j(c) ≥ Fi(c), for each c ∈ [cnj ,Cnj ), Fnj (c) > F j(c) ≥ Fi(c),
for c = Cnj , F
n
j (c) > F j(c) ≥ Fi(c), and for c ∈ (Cnj ,∞), Fnj (c) ≥ F j(c) ≥ Fi(c). Hence, for
each n ∈ N, Fi FS D Fnj .
In each case, for each n ∈ N, since Fi FS D Fnj , by strict ranking, ri((FI\{ j}, Fnj ),T ) >
r j((FI\{ j}, Fnj ),T ). Since {Fnj }∞n=1 converges to F j and for each n ∈ N, ri((FI\{ j}, Fnj ),T ) >
r j((FI\{ j}, Fnj ),T ), by continuity, ri(F,T ) ≥ r j(F,T ).
Lemma 3. If a rule r is symmetric, endowment continuous, and consistent, then it is en-
dowment monotonic.36
36Lemma 3 extends Lemma 1 of Young (1987a) from the deterministic context to the uncertain one. The
only difference between our proof and Young (1987a)’s is that Young (1987a) assumes that the endowment is
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Proof. Let r be a rule that is symmetric, endowment continuous, and consistent. By The-
orem 1, there is a function M : F → R+ such that for each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI ,
and each i ∈ I, (1) T < ∑ M(F j) ⇒ ∑ r j(F,T ) = T and ri(F,T ) ≤ M(Fi), and (2)
T ≥ ∑ M(F j)⇒ ri(F,T ) = M(Fi).
Let I ∈ N , (F,T ) ∈ PI , and T ′ ∈ (T,∞). Let t := r(F,T ) and t′ := r(F,T ′). We want
to show that t ≤ t′. If T ′ ≥ ∑ M(Fi), then for each i ∈ I, t′i = M(Fi) ≥ ti, as desired. In the
following, we assume that T ′ <
∑
M(Fi). Suppose to the contrary that there is j ∈ I such
that t j > t′j. Since T < T
′ <
∑
M(Fi),
∑
ti = T and
∑
t′i = T
′, and thus
∑
ti <
∑
t′i . Then
there is k ∈ I \ { j} such that tk < t′k.
Assume that t j + tk ≥ t′j + t′k. Let n ∈ N be such that t j + ntk < t′j + nt′k. Let I′ ∈ N and
F′ ∈ F I′ be such that j, k ∈ I′, |I′| = n + 1, F′j = F j, and for each i ∈ I′ \ { j}, F′i = Fk.
Define f : [0,
∑
M(F′i )]→ R+ by setting for each c ∈ [0,
∑
M(F′i )],
f (c) := r j(F′, c) + rk(F′, c).
By endowment continuity, f is continuous. Note that f (0) = 0. Moreover, t j + tk ≤
M(F j) + M(Fk), and for each i ∈ I′, ri(F′,∑ M(F′i )) = M(F′i ), so that f (∑ M(F′i )) =
M(F j) + M(Fk). Then t j + tk ∈ [ f (0), f (∑ M(F′i ))]. Thus, by the continuity of f , there is
Tˆ ∈ [0,∑ M(F′i )] such that f (Tˆ ) = t j + tk. By consistency, restricting (F′, Tˆ ) to (F′{ j,k}, f (Tˆ ))
yields r{ j,k}(F′, Tˆ ) = r((F j, Fk), f (Tˆ )), and restricting (F,T ) to (F{ j,k}, t j + tk) yields (t j, tk) =
r((F j, Fk), t j + tk). Then r{ j,k}(F′, Tˆ ) = (t j, tk), and thus by symmetry, for each i ∈ I′ \
{ j}, ri(F′, Tˆ ) = rk(F′, Tˆ ) = tk, so that ∑ ri(F′, Tˆ ) = t j + ntk. Since Tˆ ≤ ∑ M(F′i ), Tˆ =∑
ri(F′, Tˆ ) = t j + ntk. Recall that t′j + t
′
k ≤ t j + tk = f (Tˆ ). Since t′j + t′k ∈ [ f (0), f (Tˆ )] and f is
continuous, there is T˜ ∈ [0, Tˆ ] such that f (T˜ ) = t′j + t′k. By similar arguments, T˜ = t′j + nt′k.
Since t j + ntk < t′j + nt
′
k, Tˆ < T˜ , which contradicts Tˆ ≥ T˜ .
Assume that t j + tk < t′j + t
′
k. Let n ∈ N be such that nt j + tk > nt′j + t′k. Then by similar
arguments as in the last paragraph, we obtain a contradiction.
Lemma 4. If a rule is symmetric, endowment continuous, and consistent, then for each
pair i, j ∈ N and each pair (F,T ), (F,T ′) ∈ F {i, j}, ri(F,T ) = r j(F,T ) =⇒ (ri(F,T ′) −
T
2 )(r j(F,T
′) − T2 ) ≥ 0.
always fully allocated, whereas we invoke Theorem 1 to ensure that the endowment is fully allocated if it is
less than some threshold amount, and otherwise each agent receives his maximal assignment no matter how
large the endowment is.
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Proof. Let r be a rule that is symmetric, endowment continuous, and consistent. By The-
orem 1, there is a function M : F → R+ such that for each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI ,
and each i ∈ I, (1) T < ∑ M(F j) ⇒ ∑ r j(F,T ) = T and ri(F,T ) ≤ M(Fi), and (2)
T ≥ ∑ M(F j)⇒ ri(F,T ) = M(Fi). Moreover, by Lemma 3, r is endowment monotonic.
Let i, j ∈ N and (F,T ), (F,T ′) ∈ F {i, j} be such that ri(F,T ) = r j(F,T ). To show that
(ri(F,T ′) − T2 )(r j(F,T ′) − T2 ) ≥ 0, suppose to the contrary and without loss of generality
that ri(F,T ′) < T2 < r j(F,T
′). Since ri(F,T ) = r j(F,T ), ri(F,T ) = r j(F,T ) ≤ T2 . Assume
that ri(F,T ) = r j(F,T ) = T2 . Then ri(F,T
′) < T2 = ri(F,T ) and r j(F,T ) =
T
2 < r j(F,T
′),
which contradicts endowment monotonicity. Assume that ri(F,T ) = r j(F,T ) < T2 . Note
that r j(F,T ′) ≤ M(F j). Then r j(F,T ) < T2 < r j(F,T ′) ≤ M(F j). Since r j(F,T ) < M(F j),
T < M(Fi) + M(F j), and thus, ri(F,T ) + r j(F,T ) = T . Since ri(F,T ) + r j(F,T ) = T and
ri(F,T ) = r j(F,T ), ri(F,T ) = r j(F,T ) = T2 , which contradicts ri(F,T ) = r j(F,T ) <
T
2 .
A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 2
The “if” direction is readily verified, so we omit the proof. To show the “only if” direction,
let r be a rule satisfying strict ranking, continuity, consistency, and ordinality. By Lemma
2, r satisfies ranking, and thus symmetry. Since r is continuous, r is endowment continuous.
By Lemma 1, r is anonymous. By Lemma 3, r is endowment monotonic. By ordinality, r is
both upper ordinal and lower ordinal. By Theorem 1, there is a function M : F → R+ such
that for each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each i ∈ I, (1) T < ∑ M(F j) ⇒ ∑ r j(F,T ) = T
and ri(F,T ) ≤ M(Fi), and (2) T ≥ ∑ M(F j) ⇒ ri(F,T ) = M(Fi). We show, via the
following steps, that r is an equal-quantile rule.
Step 1: Head symmetry. If each need that does not exceed a certain amount occurs with
equal probabilities for two agents, then each endowment that does not exceed twice that
amount is equally divided between them. Formally, for each pair {i, j} ⊆ N, each (F,T ) ∈
P{i, j}, and each c ∈ R+, if Fi and F j agree on (−∞, c] and T ≤ 2c, then ri(F,T ) = r j(F,T ).
Let {i, j} ⊆ N, (F,T ) ∈ P{i, j}, and c ∈ R+ be such that Fi and F j agree on (−∞, c]
and T ≤ 2c. To show that ri(F,T ) = r j(F,T ), suppose to the contrary and without loss of
generality that ri(F,T ) < r j(F,T ). Since ri(F,T )+r j(F,T ) ≤ T ≤ 2c and ri(F,T ) < r j(F,T ),
ri(F,T ) < T2 ≤ c. Let a ∈ (ri(F,T ),min{c, r j(F,T )}) and b ∈ (max{Ci,C j},∞). Since
Fi and F j agree on (−∞, c] and a < c, and since b > max{Ci,C j}, Fi and F j agree on
(−∞, a) ∪ [b,∞). We now modify Fi and F j so that the modified claims agree on R.
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Specifically, since ri(F,T ) < a < b, we can enlarge each agent’s needs in (ri(F,T ), a)
proportionally to those in (ri(F,T ), b), transfer the probabilities of the original needs to
the enlarged needs, and then transfer all the probability on [a, b) to b. Formally, for each
k ∈ {i, j}, define F′k : R→ [0, 1] by setting for each xk ∈ R,
F′k(xk) :=
Fk(xk) xk ∈ (−∞, ri(F,T )) ∪ [b,∞)Fk(ri(F,T ) + (xk−ri(F,T ))(a−ri(F,T ))b−ri(F,T ) ) xk ∈ [ri(F,T ), b) .
It can be readily seen that for each k ∈ {i, j}, F′k has a convex support so that F′k ∈ F , and
moreover, F′i = F
′
j. Thus, by symmetry, ri((F
′
i , F
′
j), ri(F,T ) + b) = r j((F
′
i , F
′
j), ri(F,T ) + b).
On the other hand, we claim that ri((F′i , F
′
j), ri(F,T )+b) = ri(F,T ) and r j((F
′
i , F
′
j), ri(F,T )+
b) = b. Since ri(F,T ) < b, if our claim is true, then it contradicts the equality
ri((F′i , F
′
j), ri(F,T ) + b) = r j((F
′
i , F
′
j), ri(F,T ) + b).
To prove our claim, we construct for each agent k ∈ {i, j} a sequence of claims that
converges to F′k and such that each claim in the sequence is obtained by applying some
transformation on agent k’s needs. Formally, for each n ∈ N, let φn ∈ Φu be the upper
transformation defined by (6) with d1 = ri(F,T ), d2 = a, d3 = 1na + (1 − 1n )b, and d4 =
b. By upper ordinality, for each n ∈ N and each k ∈ {i, j}, rk((Fφni , Fφ
n
j ), φ
n(ri(F,T )) +
φn(r j(F,T ))) = φn(rk(F,T )). For each k ∈ {i, j}, it can be shown by routine arguments
that the sequence {Fφnk }∞n=1 of transformed claims converges to F′k.37 See Figure 4 for an
illustration. Since for each n ∈ N, φn(ri(F,T )) = ri(F,T ), lim φn(ri(F,T )) = ri(F,T ).
Moreover, since a < r j(F,T ) < b, for each n ∈ N, 1na + (1 − 1n )b < φn(r j(F,T ) < b,
and thus lim φn(r j(F,T )) = b. Then by continuity, ri((F′i , F
′
j), ri(F,T ) + b) = ri(F,T ) and
r j((F′i , F
′
j), ri(F,T ) + b) = b, as desired.
Step 2: Tail symmetry. If each need that exceeds a certain amount occurs with equal
probabilities for two agents, then each endowment that exceeds twice that amount is equally
divided between them. Formally, for each pair {i, j} ⊆ N, each (F,T ) ∈ P{i, j}, and each c ∈
[0,max{M(Fi),M(F j)}), if Fi and F j agree on [c,∞) and T ≥ 2c, then ri(F,T ) = r j(F,T ).
Let {i, j} ⊆ N, (F,T ) ∈ P{i, j}, and c ∈ [0,max{M(Fi),M(F j)}) be such that Fi and F j
agree on [c,∞) and T ≥ 2c. To show that ri(F,T ) = r j(F,T ), suppose to the contrary and
without loss of generality that ri(F,T ) < r j(F,T ).
37The proof is available upon request.
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Figure 4: Convergence of transformed claims
Assume that r j(F,T ) ≤ c. Then ri(F,T ) < r j(F,T ) ≤ c < max{M(Fi),M(F j)}, so
that either ri(F,T ) < M(Fi) or r j(F,T ) < M(F j). Then T < M(Fi) + M(F j), and thus,
ri(F,T ) + r j(F,T ) = T . Since ri(F,T ) + r j(F,T ) = T and ri(F,T ) < r j(F,T ), r j(F,T ) > T2 ≥
c, which contradicts r j(F,T ) ≤ c.
Assume that c < r j(F,T ). Let a ∈ (max{c, ri(F,T )}, r j(F,T )). Since Fi, F j ∈ F ,
and since Fi and F j agree on [c,∞) and c < a, Fi and F j agree on (−∞, 0) ∪ [a,∞).
We now modify Fi and F j so that the modified claims agree on R. Specifically, since
0 < a < r j(F,T ), we can reduce each agent’s ex-post needs in (a, r j(F,T )) proportionally
to those in (0, r j(F,T )), transfer the probabilities of the original needs to the reduced needs,
and then transfer all the probability on (0, a] to 0. Formally, for each k ∈ {i, j}, define
F′k : R→ [0, 1] by setting for each xk ∈ R,
F′k(xk) :=
Fk(xk) xk ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ [r j(F,T ),∞)Fk(r j(F,T ) − (r j(F,T )−xk)(r j(F,T )−a)r j(F,T ) ) xk ∈ [0, r j(F,T )) .
It is readily seen that for each k ∈ {i, j}, F′k has a convex support so that F′k ∈ F , and
moreover, F′i = F
′
j. Thus, by symmetry, ri((F
′
i , F
′
j), r j(F,T )) = r j((F
′
i , F
′
j), r j(F,T )). On
the other hand, we claim that ri((F′i , F
′
j), r j(F,T )) = 0 and r j((F
′
i , F
′
j), r j(F,T )) = r j(F,T ).
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Figure 5: Convergence of transformed claims
Since 0 < r j(F,T ), if our claim is true, then it contradicts the equality ri((F′i , F
′
j), r j(F,T )) =
r j((F′i , F
′
j), r j(F,T )).
To prove our claim, we construct for each agent k ∈ {i, j} a sequence of claims that
converges to F′k and such that each claim in the sequence is obtained by applying some
transformation on agent k’s needs. Formally, for each n ∈ N, let φn ∈ Φl be a lower
transformation defined by (7) with d1 = 0, d2 = 1na, d3 = a, and d4 = r j(F,T ). By lower
ordinality, for each n ∈ N and each k ∈ {i, j}, rk((Fφni , Fφ
n
j ), φ
n(ri(F,T )) + φn(r j(F,T ))) =
φn(rk(F,T )). For each k ∈ {i, j}, it can be shown by routine arguments that the sequence
{Fφnk }∞n=1 of transformed claims converges to F′k.38 See Figure 5 for an illustration. Since
0 ≤ ri(F,T ) < a, for each n ∈ N, 0 ≤ φn(ri(F,T )) < 1na, and thus lim φn(ri(F,T )) = 0.
Moreover, since for each n ∈ N, φn(r j(F,T )) = r j(F,T ), lim φn(r j(F,T )) = r j(F,T ). Then
by continuity, ri((F′i , F
′
j), r j(F,T )) = 0 and r j((F
′
i , F
′
j), r j(F,T )) = r j(F,T ), as desired.
Step 3: Head irrelevance. Changing the probability distributions of agents’ needs that are
smaller than their assignments does not affect the allocation. Formally, for each I ∈ N ,
each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each F′ ∈ F I , if for each i ∈ I, lim
xi↑ri(F,T )
F′i (xi) ≤ limxi↑ri(F,T ) Fi(xi),
38The proof is available upon request.
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C′i ≥ ri(F,T ), and Fi and F′i agree on [ri(F,T ),∞), then r(F,T ) = r(F′,T ).
Let I ∈ N and (F,T ) ∈ PI . Let i ∈ I and F′i ∈ F be such that limxi↑ri(F,T ) F
′
i (xi) ≤
lim
xi↑ri(F,T )
Fi(xi), C′i ≥ ri(F,T ), and Fi and F′i agree on [ri(F,T ),∞). To prove Step 3, it
suffices to prove that r(F,T ) = r((F′i , FI\{i}),T ). Let j ∈ N \ I and G ∈ F I∪{ j} be such that
for each k ∈ I, Gk = Fk, and G j = F′i . Let t := r(G,T + ri(F,T )). By consistency and
anonymity, it suffices to show that t j = ri(F,T ). We divide the proof into the following two
cases.
Case 1: There is  > 0 such that Fi and F′i agree on [ri(F,T ) − ,∞). To show that
t j = ri(F,T ), suppose to the contrary that t j , ri(F,T ). We derive a contradiction either
when t j > ri(F,T ) or when t j < ri(F,T ).
Assume first that t j > ri(F,T ). Then T + ri(F,T ) − t j < T . By consistency and
endowment monotonicity, ti = ri(F,T + ri(F,T ) − t j) ≤ ri(F,T ). Let c ∈ (ri(F,T ), t j).
Since Fi and F′i agree on [ri(F,T ),∞), Gi and G j agree on [c,∞). Note that t j ≤ M(G j).
Since c ∈ (ri(F,T ), t j) and t j ≤ M(G j), c ∈ (0,max{M(Gi),M(G j)}). Thus by Step 2,
ri((Gi,G j), 2c) = r j((Gi,G j), 2c). By consistency, r((Gi,G j), ti + t j) = (ti, t j). Thus by
Lemma 4, (ti − c)(t j − c) ≥ 0. Since ti ≤ ri(F,T ) and c ∈ (ri(F,T ), t j), ti < c < t j, which
contradicts (ti − c)(t j − c) ≥ 0.
Assume now that t j < ri(F,T ). Then T + ri(F,T ) − t j > T . By consistency and
endowment monotonicity, ti = ri(F,T + ri(F,T ) − t j) ≥ ri(F,T ). Let c ∈ (max{ri(F,T ) −
, t j}, ri(F,T )). Since Fi and F′i agree on [ri(F,T ) − ,∞), Gi and G j agree on [c,∞). Note
that ri(F,T ) ≤ M(Fi), and thus ri(F,T ) ≤ M(Gi). Since c ∈ (max{ri(F,T ) − , t j}, ri(F,T ))
and ri(F,T ) ≤ M(Gi), c ∈ (0,max{M(Gi),M(G j)}). Thus by Step 2, ri((Gi,G j), 2c) =
r j((Gi,G j), 2c). By consistency, r((Gi,G j), ti + t j) = (ti, t j). Thus by Lemma 4, (ti − c)(t j −
c) ≥ 0. Since ti ≥ ri(F,T ) and c ∈ (max{ri(F,T ) − , t j}, ri(F,T )), t j < c < ti, which
contradicts the inequality (ti − c)(t j − c) ≥ 0.
Case 2: There is no  > 0 such that Fi and F′i agree on [ri(F,T )− ,∞). In this case, we
construct a sequence {F′ni }∞n=1 of agent i’s claims that converges to F′i and such that for each
n ∈ N, F′ni agrees with Fi on [ri(F,T ) − ,∞) for some  > 0, so that we can use continuity
and the result in Case 1 to show that t j = ri(F,T ).
To construct such a sequence {F′ni }∞n=1, we first construct two sequences {an}∞n=1 and
{bn}∞n=1 of elements of R such that (1) lim an = ri(F,T ) and (2) for each n ∈ N, an <
bn < ri(F,T ) and F′i (a
n) < Fi(bn). Condition (2) ensures that for each n ∈ N, F′ni can be
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constructed such that it agrees with F′i on (−∞, an] and with Fi on [bn,∞). Formally, for
each n ∈ N, let an := 1nci + (1− 1n )ri(F,T ). Clearly, condition (1) is satisfied. For each n ∈ N,
to see that we can find bn such that an and bn satisfy condition (2), it suffices to show that
ci < ri(F,T ) and F′i (a
n) < lim
xi↑ri(F,T )
Fi(xi).
To see that ci < ri(F,T ), suppose to the contrary that ri(F,T ) ≤ ci. Then lim
xi↑ri(F,T )
Fi(xi) =
0. Since 0 ≤ lim
xi↑ri(F,T )
F′i (xi) ≤ limxi↑ri(F,T ) Fi(xi) = 0, and since Fi and F
′
i agree on [ri(F,T ),∞),
Fi and F′i agree on R. This contradicts our assumption that there is no  > 0 such that Fi
and F′i agree on [ri(F,T ) − ,∞).
For each n ∈ N, to see that F′i (an) < limxi↑ri(F,T ) Fi(xi), suppose to the contrary that there
is m ∈ N such that lim
xi↑ri(F,T )
Fi(xi) ≤ F′i (am). Since ci < ri(F,T ), by definition, am < am+1 <
ri(F,T ). Thus, F′i (a
m) ≤ F′i (am+1) ≤ limxi↑ri(F,T ) F
′
i (xi) ≤ limxi↑ri(F,T ) Fi(xi) ≤ F
′
i (a
m). Hence,
F′i (a
m) = F′i (a
m+1) = lim
xi↑ri(F,T )
Fi(xi). Since C′i ≥ ri(F,T ) > am+1 > am and F′i (am) =
F′i (a
m+1), and since the support of F′i is convex, a
m < c′i , and thus F
′
i (a
m) = 0. Then
lim
xi↑ri(F,T )
Fi(xi) = F′i (a
m) = 0, which contradicts ci < ri(F,T ).
For each n ∈ N, define F′ni : R→ [0, 1] by setting for each xi ∈ R,
F′ni (xi) :=

F′i (xi) xi ∈ (−∞, an)
F′i (a
n) + [Fi(b
n)−F′i (an)](xi−an)
bn−an xi ∈ [an, bn)
Fi(xi) xi ∈ [bn,∞)
.
For each n ∈ N, since an < bn and F′i (an) < Fi(bn), F′ni is a well-defined CDF, and it
can be readily seen that F′ni has a convex support, so F
′n
i ∈ F . We claim that {F′ni }∞n=1
converges to F′i . We first check that {F′ni }∞n=1 weakly converges to F′i . Note that for each
xi ∈ (−∞, ri(F,T )) and for sufficiently large n ∈ N, xi < an, and thus, F′ni (xi) = F′i (xi).
Moreover, for each xi ∈ [ri(F,T ),∞) and each n ∈ N, F′ni (xi) = Fi(xi) = F′i (xi). Hence,
for each xi ∈ R, lim F′ni (xi) = F′i (xi). We then check lim c′ni = c′i . Since ci < ri(F,T )
and Fi(ri(F,T )) = F′i (ri(F,T )), c
′
i ≤ ri(F,T ). Assume c′i < ri(F,T ). Then for sufficiently
large n ∈ N, c′i < an. For sufficiently large n ∈ N, since F′ni and F′i agree on (−∞, an) and
c′i < a
n, c′ni = c
′
i . Assume c
′
i = ri(F,T ). Then for each n ∈ N, an < c′i . For each n ∈ N,
since F′ni and F
′
i agree on (−∞, an) and an < c′i , and since F′ni is increasing on [an, bn),
c′ni = a
n. In either case, lim c′ni = c
′
i . Lastly, we check lim C
′n
i = C
′
i . By the definition of a
rule, Ci ≥ ri(F,T ). Assume Ci > ri(F,T ). For each n ∈ N, since F′ni , Fi, and F′i agree on
[ri(F,T ),∞) and Ci > ri(F,T ), C′ni = Ci = C′i . Assume Ci = ri(F,T ). Since Fi and F′i agree
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on [ri(F,T ),∞) and C′i ≥ ri(F,T ) = Ci, C′i = Ci. For each n ∈ N, since F′ni and Fi agree on
[bn,∞) and Ci = ri(F,T ) > bn, C′ni = Ci. Thus, for each n ∈ N, C′ni = Ci = C′i . In either
case, lim C′ni = C
′
i . Hence, {F′ni }∞n=1 converges to F′i .
For each n ∈ N, let Gn ∈ F I∪{ j} be such that for each k ∈ I, Gnk = Fk, and Gnj = F′ni .
For each n ∈ N, since bn < ri(F,T ) and Fi and F′ni agree on [bn,∞), by applying the same
arguments as in Case 1, r j(Gn,T + ri(F,T )) = ri(F,T ). Since for each n ∈ N, r j(Gn,T +
ri(F,T )) = ri(F,T ), and since {F′ni }∞n=1 converges to F′i , by continuity, t j = ri(F,T ), as
desired.
Step 4: Tail irrelevance. Changing the probability distributions of agents’ needs that are
larger than their assignments does not affect the allocation. Formally, for each I ∈ N , each
(F,T ) ∈ PI , and each F′ ∈ F I , if for each i ∈ I, ci = ri(F,T ) implies c′i = ri(F,T ), and Fi
and F′i agree on (−∞, ri(F,T )], then r(F,T ) = r(F′,T ).
Let I ∈ N and (F,T ) ∈ PI . Let i ∈ I and F′i ∈ F be such that ci = ri(F,T ) implies
c′i = ri(F,T ), and Fi and F
′
i agree on (−∞, ri(F,T )]. Since Fi and F′i agree on (−∞, ri(F,T )],
C′i ≥ ri(F,T ). To prove Step 4, it suffices to show that r(F,T ) = r((F′i , FI\{i}),T ). Let
j ∈ N \ I. Let G ∈ F I∪{ j} be such that for each k ∈ I, Gk = Fk, and G j = F′i . Let
t := r(G,T + ri(F,T )). By consistency and anonymity, it suffices to show that t j = ri(F,T ).
We divide the proof into the following two cases.
Case 1: There is  > 0 such that Fi and F′i agrees on (−∞, ri(F,T ) + ]. To show
that t j = ri(F,T ), suppose to the contrary that t j , ri(F,T ). We will derive contradictions,
respectively, when t j > ri(F,T ) and when t j < ri(F,T ).
Assume first that t j > ri(F,T ). Then T + ri(F,T ) − t j < T . By consistency and endow-
ment monotonicity, ti = ri(F,T + ri(F,T )− t j) ≤ ri(F,T ). Let c ∈ (ri(F,T ),min{t j, ri(F,T )+
}). Since Fi and F′i agree on (−∞, ri(F,T ) + ], Gi and G j agree on (−∞, c]. By Step
1, ri((Gi,G j), 2c) = r j((Gi,G j), 2c). By consistency, r((Gi,G j), ti + t j) = (ti, t j). Thus by
Lemma 4, (ti − c)(t j − c) ≥ 0. Since ti ≤ ri(F,T ) and c ∈ (ri(F,T ),min{t j, ri(F,T ) + }),
ti < c < t j, which contradicts (ti − c)(t j − c) ≥ 0.
Assume now that t j < ri(F,T ). Then T + ri(F,T ) − t j > T . By consistency and
endowment monotonicity, ti = ri(F,T + ri(F,T )− t j) ≥ ri(F,T ). Let c ∈ (t j, ri(F,T )). Since
Fi and F′i agree on (−∞, ri(F,T )], Gi and G j agree on (−∞, c]. By Step 1, ri((Gi,G j), 2c) =
r j((Gi,G j), 2c). By consistency, r((Gi,G j), ti + t j) = (ti, t j). Thus by Lemma 4, (ti − c)(t j −
c) ≥ 0. Since ti ≥ ri(F,T ) and c ∈ (t j, ri(F,T )), t j < c < ti, which contradicts (ti − c)(t j −
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c) ≥ 0.
Case 2: There is no  > 0 such that Fi and F′i agrees on (−∞, ri(F,T ) + ]. In this case,
we are going to construct a sequence {F′ni }∞n=1 of agent i’s claims that converges to F′i and
such that for each n ∈ N, F′ni agrees with Fi on (−∞, ri(F,T ) + ] for some  > 0, so that
we can use continuity and the result in Case 1 to show that t j = ri(F,T ).
To construct such a sequence {F′ni }∞n=1, we first construct two sequences {an}∞n=1 and
{bn}∞n=1 of elements of R such that (1) lim bn = ri(F,T ) and (2) for each n ∈ N, ri(F,T ) <
an < bn and Fi(an) < F′i (b
n). Condition (2) ensures that for each n ∈ N, F′ni can be
constructed such that it agrees with Fi on (−∞, an] and with F′i on [bn,∞). Formally, for
each n ∈ N, let bn := ri(F,T ) + 1n . Clearly, condition (1) is satisfied. For each n ∈ N, to
see that we can find an such that an and bn satisfy condition (2), it suffices to show that
Fi(ri(F,T )) < F′i (b
n). To do this, we first show that c′i ≤ ri(F,T ) < Ci.
To see that ri(F,T ) < Ci, suppose to the contrary that ri(F,T ) ≥ Ci. Then Fi(ri(F,T )) =
1. Since Fi(ri(F,T )) = 1 and Fi and F′i agree on (−∞, ri(F,T )], Fi and F′i agree on R,
which contradicts our assumption that there is no  > 0 such that Fi and F′i agrees on
(−∞, ri(F,T ) + ].
To see that ri(F,T ) ≥ c′i , suppose to the contrary that ri(F,T ) < c′i . Since ri(F,T ) < c′i
and Fi and F′i agree on (−∞, ri(F,T )], ri(F,T ) ≤ ci. Since ri(F,T ) < c′i and ci = ri(F,T )
implies c′i = ri(F,T ), ci , ri(F,T ). Thus, ri(F,T ) < ci. The fact that ri(F,T ) < ci and
ri(F,T ) < c′i contradicts our assumption that there is no  > 0 such that Fi and F
′
i agrees on
(−∞, ri(F,T ) + ].
Now we show that for each n ∈ N, Fi(ri(F,T )) < F′i (bn). Let n ∈ N. If F′i (bn) = 1, since
ri(F,T ) < Ci, Fi(ri(F,T )) < 1 = F′i (b
n). Assume that F′i (b
n) < 1. Then C′i > b
n. Since
C′i > b
n > ri(F,T ) ≥ c′i and F′i has a convex support, F′i (bn) > F′i (ri(F,T )). Since Fi and F′i
agree on (−∞, ri(F,T )], Fi(ri(F,T )) = F′i (ri(F,T )). Thus, F′i (bn) > Fi(ri(F,T )).
For each n ∈ N, define F′ni : R→ [0, 1] by setting for each xi ∈ R,
F′ni (xi) :=

Fi(xi) xi ∈ (−∞, an)
Fi(an) +
[F′i (b
n)−Fi(an)](xi−an)
bn−an xi ∈ [an, bn)
F′i (xi) xi ∈ [bn,−∞)
.
For each n ∈ N, since an < bn and Fi(an) < F′i (bn), F′ni is a well-defined CDF, and it
can be readily seen that F′ni has a convex support, so F
′n
i ∈ F . We claim that {F′ni }∞n=1
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converges to F′i . We first check that {F′ni }∞n=1 weakly converges to F′i . Note that for each
xi ∈ (−∞, ri(F,T )] and each n ∈ N, F′ni (xi) = Fi(xi) = F′i (xi). Moreover, for each xi ∈
(ri(F,T ),∞) and for sufficiently large n ∈ N, xi ≥ bn, and thus, F′ni (xi) = F′i (xi). Hence, for
each xi ∈ R, lim F′ni (xi) = Fi(xi). We then check that lim c′ni = c′i . Recall that ri(F,T ) ≥ c′i .
Assume that ri(F,T ) > c′i . Since Fi and F
′
i agree on (−∞, ri(F,T )], for each n ∈ N, c′ni = c′i .
Assume that ri(F,T ) = c′i . For each n ∈ N, since Fi and F′i agree on (−∞, ri(F,T )] and
F′ni (b
n) = F′i (b
n) > Fi(an) ≥ 0, ri(F,T ) ≤ c′ni ≤ bn = ri(F,T ) + 1n . In either case, lim c′ni =
c′i . Lastly, we check lim C
′n
i = C
′
i . Since ri(F,T ) < Ci and F
′
i (ri(F,T )) = Fi(ri(F,T )),
ri(F,T ) < C′i . Then for sufficiently large n ∈ N, bn < C′i , and thus C′ni = C′i . Hence,
lim C′ni = C
′
i . Thus, {F′ni }∞n=1 converges to F′i .
For each n ∈ N, let Gn ∈ F I∪{ j} be such that for each k ∈ I, Gnk = Fk, and Gnj =
F′ni . For each n ∈ N, since an > ri(F,T ) and Fi and F′ni agree on (−∞, an], by applying
the same arguments as in Case 1, r j(Gn,T + ri(F,T )) = ri(F,T ). Since for each n ∈ N,
r j(Gn,T + ri(F,T )) = ri(F,T ), and since {F′ni }∞n=1 non-degenerately converges to F′i , by
continuity, t j = ri(F,T ), as desired.
Step 5: No domination. No agent is assigned a larger amount of the resource than another
agent while having a larger probability of generating waste than the other agent. Formally,
for each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each pair {i, j} ⊆ I, if ri(F,T ) > r j(F,T ), then
lim
xi↑ri(F,T )
Fi(xi) ≤ F j(r j(F,T )).
Let I ∈ N , (F,T ) ∈ PI , and {i, j} ⊆ I. Let t := r(F,T ). Suppose to the contrary that
ti > t j and lim
xi↑ti
Fi(xi) > F j(t j). We construct two claims F′i , F
′
j ∈ F , respectively, of agents
i and j such that F′j%FS DF′i and r((F′i , F′j, FI\{i, j}),T ) = t. If we are able to construct such
claims, then by ranking, F′j%FS DF′i implies ri((F′i , F′j, FI\{i, j}),T ) ≤ r j((F′i , F′j, FI\{i, j}),T ),
which contradicts that ri((F′i , F
′
j, FI\{i, j}),T ) = ti > t j = r j((F
′
i , F
′
j, FI\{i, j}),T ), as desired.
We construct F′i and F
′
j by changing the “head” of Fi and the “tail” of F j. Formally,
define F′i , F
′
j : R→ [0, 1] by setting for each c ∈ R,
F′i (c) :=

0 c ∈ (−∞, 0)
lim
xi↑ti
Fi(xi) − ti−c2ti [limxi↑ti Fi(xi) − F j(t j)] c ∈ [0, ti)
Fi(c) c ∈ [ti,∞)
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and
F′j(c) :=

F j(c) c ∈ (−∞, t j)
F j(t j) +
c−t j
2(Ci−t j) [limxi↑ti
Fi(xi) − F j(t j)] c ∈ [t j,Ci)
1 c ∈ [Ci,∞)
.
Since F j(t j) < lim
xi↑ti
Fi(xi) ≤ Fi(ti) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ t j < ti ≤ supp Fi, F′i , F′j are well-defined
CDFs with convex supports. Thus, F′i , F
′
j ∈ F .
We check that F′j %FS D F′i . For each c ∈ (−∞, 0), F′i (c) = 0 = F j(c) = F′j(c). For each
c ∈ [0, ti), F′i (c) ≥ F′i (0) = 12 limxi↑ti Fi(xi) +
1
2 F j(t j) = limx j↑Ci
F′j(x j) ≥ F′j(c). For each c ∈ [ti,Ci),
F′i (c) = Fi(c) ≥ Fi(ti) ≥ limxi↑ti Fi(xi) >
1
2 limxi↑ti
Fi(xi) + 12 F j(t j) = limx j↑Ci
F′j(x j) ≥ F′j(c). For each
c ∈ [Ci,∞), F′i (c) = Fi(c) = 1 = F′j(c). Hence, F′j %FS D F′i .
Lastly, we check that r((F′i , F
′
j, FI\{i, j}),T ) = t. It is readily seen that limxi↑ti
F′i (xi) =
lim
xi↑ti
Fi(xi), C′i ≥ ti, and Fi and F′i agree on [ti,∞). Thus, by Step 3, r((F′i , FI\{i}),T ) = t.
Moreover, if c j = t j, since F j and F′j agree on (−∞, t j] and for each c > t j, F′j(c) > 0,
then c′j = t j. Since c j = t j implies c
′
j = t j and F j and F
′
j agree on (−∞, t j], by Step 4,
r((F′i , F
′
j, FI\{i, j}),T ) = t.
Step 6: No vertical domination. No agent is assigned an equal amount of the resource as
another agent while having a larger probability of generating waste than the other agent.
Formally, for each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each pair {i, j} ⊆ I, if ri(F,T ) = r j(F,T ),
then
[ lim
xi↑ri(F,T )
Fi(xi), Fi(ri(F,T ))] ∩ [ lim
x j↑r j(F,T )
F j(x j), F j(r j(F,T ))] , ∅.
Let I ∈ N , (F,T ) ∈ PI , {i, j} ⊆ I, and t := r(F,T ). Suppose to the contrary and without
loss of generality that ti = t j and Fi(ti) < lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j). Then t j > 0, and thus, T ≥ t j > 0.
We construct two claims F′i , F
′
j ∈ F , respectively, of agents i and j such that F′i FS D F′j
and r((F′i , F
′
j, FI\{i, j}),T ) = t. If we are able to construct such claims, then by strict ranking,
F′i FS D F′j and T > 0 together imply ri((F′i , F′j, FI\{i, j}),T ) > r j((F′i , F′j, FI\{i, j}),T ), which
contradicts that ri((F′i , F
′
j, FI\{i, j}),T ) = ti = t j = r j((F
′
i , F
′
j, FI\{i, j}),T ), as desired.
We construct F′i by first changing the head of Fi and then the tail. First, define F
′′
i :
R→ [0, 1] by setting for each xi ∈ R,
F′′i (xi) :=
0 xi ∈ (−∞, ti)Fi(xi) xi ∈ [ti,∞) .
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It can be readily seen that F′′i is a well-defined CDF with a convex support. Thus, F
′′
i ∈ F .
Moreover, lim
xi↑ti
F′′i (xi) = 0 ≤ limxi↑ti Fi(xi), C
′′
i ≥ ti, and Fi and F′′i agree on [ti,∞). Thus, by
Step 3, r((F′′i , FI\{i}),T ) = t.
Then define F′i : R→ [0, 1] by setting for each xi ∈ R,
F′i (xi) :=

0 xi ∈ (−∞, ti)
Fi(ti) + xi−tiC j+1−ti [limx j↑t j
F j(x j) − Fi(ti)] xi ∈ [ti,C j + 1)
1 xi ∈ (C j + 1,∞)
.
Since ti = t j < C j + 1 and Fi(ti) < lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j) ≤ 1, F′i is a well-defined CDF, and it can be
readily seen that F′i has a convex support. Thus, F
′
i ∈ F . Since c′i = ti and F′′i and F′i agree
on (−∞, ti], by Step 4, r((F′i , FI\{i}),T ) = t.
We construct F′j by changing the head of F j. Since limx j↑t j
F j(x j) > Fi(ti), lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j) > 0.
Thus, we can pick t′j ∈ (0, t j) such that F j(t′j) > 0. Define F′j : R → [0, 1] by setting for
each x j ∈ R,
F′j(x j) :=

0 x j ∈ (−∞, 0)
t′j+x j
2t′j
F j(t′j) x j ∈ [0, t′j)
F j(x j) x j ∈ [t′j,∞)
.
Since t′j > 0 and F j(t
′
j) > 0, F
′
j is a well-defined CDF, and it can be readily seen that F
′
j has
a convex support. Thus, F′j ∈ F . Since t j > t′j, limx j↑t j F
′
j(x j) = limx j↑t j
F j(x j), C′j ≥ t j, and F j and
F′j agree on [t j,∞). Thus, by Step 3, r((F′i , F′j, FI\{i, j}),T ) = t.
Lastly, we check that F′i FS D F′j. It is readily seen that [c′j,C′j] = [0,C j]. Thus,
we need to check that for each c ∈ R \ [0,C j], F′i (c) ≤ F′j(c), and for each c ∈ [0,C j],
F′i (c) < F
′
j(c). For each c ∈ (−∞, 0), F′i (c) = 0 = F′j(c). For each c ∈ [0, ti), F′i (c) = 0 <
1
2 F j(t
′
j) = F
′
j(0) ≤ F′j(c). For each c ∈ [ti,C j], since t′j < t j = ti ≤ c < C j + 1, F′i (c) <
lim
xi↑C j+1
F′i (xi) = limx j↑t j
F j(x j) ≤ F j(c) = F′j(c). For each c ∈ (C j,∞), since t′j < t j ≤ C j < c,
F′i (c) ≤ 1 = F j(c) = F′j(c). Hence, F′i FS D F′j.
Step 7: No “unjustifiable” domination. Consider an arbitrary two-agent problem with
agents, say, i and j. We say that agent j’s probability of generating waste in the two-agent
problem is unjustifiably large if it is larger than a third agent’s, say, k’s, probability of
generating waste in a three-agent problem, with agents i, j, k, in which agent i is assigned
the same amount as in the two-agent problem. Agent j cannot receive a larger amount
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of the resource than agent i in the two-agent problem while having an unjustifiably large
probability of generating waste. Formally, let {i, j, k} ⊆ N, and let for each h ∈ {i, j, k},
Fh ∈ F and th ∈ [0,Ch] be such that r((Fi, F j), ti + t j) = (ti, t j), ti < t j, and for each
T ∈ [0, ti + t j), ri((Fi, F j),T ) < ti. If r((Fi, Fk), ti + tk) = (ti, tk), then lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j) ≤ Fk(tk).
Let {i, j, k} ⊆ N and let for each h ∈ {i, j, k}, Fh ∈ F and th ∈ [0,Ch] be such that
r((Fi, F j), ti + t j) = (ti, t j), ti < t j, and for each T ∈ [0, ti + t j), ri((Fi, F j),T ) < ti. Suppose
to the contrary that r((Fi, Fk), ti + tk) = (ti, tk) and lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j) > Fk(tk).
Let t′j > max{t j, tk}. Let φ ∈ Φu be an upper transformation defined by (6) with d1 = ti,
d2 = t j, d3 = t′j, and d4 > max{t′j,C j}. By upper ordinality, r((Fφi , Fφj ), φ(ti) + φ(t j)) =
(φ(ti), φ(t j)). Thus, r((F
φ
i , F
φ
j ), ti + t
′
j) = (ti, t
′
j). We claim that r((Fi, F
φ
j ), ti + t
′
j) = (ti, t
′
j).
To see this, note first that since t j > ti ≥ 0 and for each T ∈ [0, ti + t j), ri((Fi, F j),T ) < ti,
ti > 0. We then check that c
φ
i = ti implies ci = ti. Assume that c
φ
i = ti. Then for each
xi ∈ [0, ti), since φ(xi) < ti, Fi(xi) = Fφi (φ(xi)) = 0, and for each xi ∈ (ti,∞), since φ(xi) > ti,
Fi(xi) = F
φ
i (φ(xi)) > 0. Thus, ci = ti. Since c
φ
i = ti implies ci = ti and F
φ
i and Fi agree on
(−∞, ti], by Step 4, r((Fi, Fφj ), ti + t′j) = (ti, t′j). Let t′′ := r((Fi, Fφj , Fk), ti + t′j + tk). We will
derive a contradiction, respectively, when t′′j ≥ t′j and when t′′j < t′j.
Assume first that t′′j ≥ t′j. Then ti + t′j + tk − t′′j ≤ ti + tk. By consistency and endowment
monotonicity, t′′k = rk((Fi, Fk), ti + t
′
j + tk − t′′j ) ≤ rk((Fi, Fk), ti + tk) = tk. Thus, Fk(t′′k ) ≤
Fk(tk) < lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j) = lim
x j↑t′j
Fφj (x j) ≤ limx j↑t′′j F
φ
j (x j), where the strict inequality holds by our
initial hypothesis. On the other hand, t′′j ≥ t′j > tk ≥ t′′k , where the strict inequality follows
from our choice of t′j. Since t
′′
j > t
′′
k , by Step 5, limx j↑t′′j
Fφj (x j) ≤ Fk(t′′k ), which contradicts
Fk(t′′k ) < limx j↑t′′j
Fφj (x j).
Assume now that t′′j < t
′
j. By consistency, r((Fi, F
φ
j ), t
′′
i + t
′′
j ) = (t
′′
i , t
′′
j ). Since
r((Fi, F
φ
j ), t
′′
i + t
′′
j ) = (t
′′
i , t
′′
j ) and r((Fi, F
φ
j ), ti + t
′
j) = (ti, t
′
j), and since t
′′
j < t
′
j, by en-
dowment monotonicity, t′′i ≤ ti. By the definition of φ, we can pick c ∈ [0, t j) such that
φ(c) ∈ (t′′j , t′j). Since c < t j, ti + c < ti + t j. Since ti + c ∈ [0, ti + t j) and for each
T ∈ [0, ti + t j), ri((Fi, F j),T ) < ti, ri((Fi, F j), ti + c) < ti. Then φ(ri((Fi, F j), ti + c)) =
ri((Fi, F j), ti + c) < ti. By upper ordinality, ri((F
φ
i , F
φ
j ), φ(ti) + φ(c)) = φ(ri((Fi, F j), ti + c)).
Thus, ri((F
φ
i , F
φ
j ), ti + φ(c)) < ti. Since ri((F
φ
i , F
φ
j ), ti + φ(c)) < ti and F
φ
i and Fi agree
on (−∞, ti], cφi = ri((Fφi , Fφj ), ti + φ(c)) implies ci = ri((Fφi , Fφj ), ti + φ(c)). Thus, by
Step 4, ri((Fi, F
φ
j ), ti + φ(c)) = ri((F
φ
i , F
φ
j ), ti + φ(c)). Since t
′′
i ≤ ti and t′′j < φ(c),
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by endowment monotonicity, ri((Fi, F
φ
j ), t
′′
i + t
′′
j ) ≤ ri((Fi, Fφj ), ti + φ(c)). Then t′′i =
ri((Fi, F
φ
j ), t
′′
i + t
′′
j ) ≤ ri((Fi, Fφj ), ti +φ(c)) = ri((Fφi , Fφj ), ti +φ(c)) < ti. Note that ti ≤ M(Fi).
Since t′′i < ti ≤ M(Fi), t′′i + t′′j + t′′k = ti + t′j + tk. Since t′′j < t′j and t′′i + t′′j + t′′k = ti + t′j + tk,
t′′i + t
′′
k > ti + tk. Then by endowment monotonicity, ri((Fi, Fk), t
′′
i + t
′′
k ) ≥ ri((Fi, Fk), ti + tk).
By consistency, ri((Fi, Fk), t′′i + t
′′
k ) = t
′′
i . Thus, t
′′
i ≥ ti, which contradicts t′′i < ti.
Step 8: Equal quantiles. All agents have equal probabilities of generating waste. For-
mally, for each I ∈ N , each (F,T ) ∈ PI , and each pair {i, j} ⊆ I,
[ lim
xi↑ri(F,T )
Fi(xi), Fi(ri(F,T ))] ∩ [ lim
x j↑r j(F,T )
F j(x j), F j(r j(F,T ))] , ∅.
Let I ∈ N , (F,T ) ∈ PI , {i, j} ⊆ I, and t := r(F,T ). Suppose to the contrary and without
loss of generality that Fi(ti) < lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j). By consistency, r((Fi, F j), ti + t j) = (ti, t j). Let
k ∈ N \ I. We will pick Fk ∈ F and tk ∈ [0,Ck] such that r((F j, Fk), t j + tk) = (t j, tk),
t j < tk, and for each T ′ ∈ [0, t j + tk), r j((F j, Fk),T ′) < t j. Then we will show that agent
k has an unjustifiably large probability of generating waste, i.e., Fi(ti) < lim
xk↑tk
Fk(xk), which
contradicts Step 7.
Since Fi(ti) < lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j), we can pick Fk ∈ F such that Fi(ti) < Fk(t j) <
lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j). Note that t j ≤ M(F j) = r j((F j, Fk),M(F j) + M(Fk)). Since t j ∈
[r j((F j, Fk), 0), r j((F j, Fk),M(F j) + M(Fk)], by endowment continuity, there is a smallest
endowment T ∗ ∈ [0,M(F j) + M(Fk)] satisfying r j((F j, Fk),T ∗) = t j. Thus, by endowment
monotonicity, for each T ′ ∈ [0,T ∗), r j((F j, Fk),T ′) < t j. Let tk := rk((F j, Fk),T ∗). Thus,
tk ∈ [0,Ck]. Since T ∗ ∈ [0,M(F j) + M(Fk)] and r((F j, Fk),T ∗) = (t j, tk), t j + tk = T ∗. Then
r((F j, Fk), t j + tk) = (t j, tk) and for each T ′ ∈ [0, t j + tk), r j((F j, Fk),T ′) < t j.
We check that t j < tk. Suppose to the contrary that tk ≤ t j. Then Fk(tk) ≤
Fk(t j) < lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j), where the strict inequality follows from the choice of Fk. Since
r((F j, Fk), t j + tk) = (t j, tk), if tk < t j, by Step 5, lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j) ≤ Fk(tk), and if tk = t j, by
Step 6, [lim
xk↑tk
Fk(xk), Fk(tk)] ∩ [lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j), F j(t j)] , ∅. In either case, we get a contradiction
to Fk(tk) < lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j). Hence, t j < tk.
Lastly, we check that Fi(ti) < lim
xk↑tk
Fk(xk). By the choice of Fk, Fi(ti) < Fk(t j). Since
t j < tk, Fk(t j) ≤ lim
xk↑tk
Fk(xk). Thus, Fi(ti) < lim
xk↑tk
Fk(xk).
Step 9: A common and positive maximal probability of satiation. All agents have equal
maximal probabilities of being satiated, and this common maximal probability is positive.
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Formally, there is λ ∈ (0, 1] such that for each i ∈ N and each Fi ∈ F , M(Fi) = QFi(λ), and
thus, M(Fi) ≥ ci.
Let j ∈ N and F j ∈ F be such that F j is atomless and c j = 0. Let λ :=
F j(M(F j)). Since F j is atomless, lim
x j↑M(F j)
F j(x j) = F j(M(F j)) = λ. For each i ∈ N
and each Fi ∈ F , r((Fi, F j),M(Fi) + M(F j)) = (M(Fi),M(F j)), and thus, by Step 8,
[ lim
xi↑M(Fi)
Fi(xi), Fi(M(Fi))] ∩ [ lim
x j↑M(F j)
F j(x j), F j(M(F j))] , ∅. Hence, for each i ∈ N and
each Fi ∈ F , λ ∈ [ lim
xi↑M(Fi)
Fi(xi), Fi(M(Fi))].
We check that λ > 0. Suppose to the contrary that λ = 0. Since F j(M(F j)) = λ = 0
and c j = 0, M(F j) = 0. Let k ∈ N \ { j}. We will construct Fk ∈ F such that M(Fk) = 0
and F j FS D Fk. If we are able to construct such a claim Fk, then for each T > 0, M(F j) =
M(Fk) = 0 implies r((F j, Fk),T ) = (0, 0), which, together with F j FS D Fk, contradicts
strict ranking, as desired. We construct Fk as follows. Define Fk : R→ [0, 1] by setting for
each xk ∈ R,
Fk(xk) :=

0 xk ∈ (−∞, 0)
1
2 F j(xk) +
1
2 xk ∈ [0, 12C j)
1 xk ∈ [12C j,∞)
.
It is readily seen that Fk is a well-defined CDF. Since F j is atomless, C j > 0. Since c j = 0 <
1
2C j < C j and F j has a convex support, Fk has a convex support with [ck,Ck] = [0,
1
2C j].
Thus, Fk ∈ F . We first show that F j FS D Fk. For each c ∈ [0, 12C j], since F j(c) < 1,
F j(c) < Fk(c). For each c ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (12C j,∞), it can be readily seen that F j(c) ≤ Fk(c).
Hence, F j FS D Fk. We now show that M(Fk) = 0. Recall that for each i ∈ N and each
Fi ∈ F , λ ∈ [ lim
xi↑M(Fi)
Fi(xi), Fi(M(Fi))]. Since λ = 0, 0 ∈ [ lim
xk↑M(Fk)
Fk(xk), Fk(M(Fk))]. Since
lim
xk↑M(Fk)
Fk(xk) ≤ 0, M(Fk) ≤ ck. Since M(Fk) ≤ ck = 0, M(Fk) = 0.
Lastly, we show that for each i ∈ N, M(Fi) = QFi(λ) and M(Fi) ≥ ci. Let i ∈ N. Since
λ ≤ Fi(M(Fi)), by the definition of QFi , to show M(Fi) = QFi(λ), it suffices to show that
for each xi ∈ (−∞,M(Fi)), Fi(xi) < λ. Let x′i ∈ (−∞,M(Fi)). Consider the following
three cases. First, lim
xi↑M(Fi)
Fi(xi) = 0. Since lim
xi↑M(Fi)
Fi(xi) = 0 and λ > 0, Fi(x′i) = 0 < λ.
Second, 0 < lim
xi↑M(Fi)
Fi(xi) < 1. Since 0 < lim
xi↑M(Fi)
Fi(xi) < 1 and the support of Fi is
convex, Fi(x′i) < limxi↑M(Fi)
Fi(xi). Moreover, since lim
xi↑M(Fi)
Fi(xi) ≤ λ, Fi(x′i) < λ. Third,
lim
xi↑M(Fi)
Fi(xi) = 1. Since 1 = lim
xi↑M(Fi)
Fi(xi) ≤ λ ≤ 1, λ = 1. Note that M(Fi) ≤ Ci. Then
Fi(x′i) < 1, and thus, Fi(x
′
i) < λ. Moreover, since 0 < λ ≤ Fi(M(Fi)), M(Fi) ≥ ci.
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Step 10: Constrained equal awards for sure needs. When the endowment is no larger
than the sum of the agents’ sure needs, all agents receive equal assignments capped at their
sure needs. Formally, for each I ∈ N and each (F,T ) ∈ PI , if T ≤ ∑ ci, then for each j ∈ I,
r j(F,T ) = min{c∗, c j} where c∗ satisfies ∑ min{c∗, ci} = T .
Let I ∈ N and (F,T ) ∈ PI be such that T ≤ ∑ ci. Let c∗ ∈ R+ be such that∑
min{c∗, ci} = T . Let t := r(F,T ). Suppose to the contrary that there is j ∈ I such that
t j , min{c∗, c j}. By Step 9, ∑ M(Fi) ≥ ∑ ci. Then ∑ M(Fi) ≥ T , and thus, ∑ ti = T . Since∑
ti = T =
∑
min{c∗, ci} and t j , min{c∗, c j}, we can assume without loss of generality that
t j > min{c∗, c j}, and for some k ∈ I \ { j}, tk < min{c∗, ck}. Since tk < min{c∗, ck} ≤ ck,
lim
xk↑tk
Fk(xk) = Fk(tk) = 0. By Step 8, [lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j), F j(t j)] ∩ [lim
xk↑tk
Fk(xk), Fk(tk)] , ∅.
Thus, lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j) ≤ 0, and hence, t j ≤ c j. Since min{c∗, c j} < t j ≤ c j, c∗ < c j and
c∗ < t j. Since tk < min{c∗, ck}, we can pick c ∈ (tk,min{c∗, ck}). Since c < min{c∗, ck}
and c∗ < c j, c < min{c j, ck}. Then F j and Fk agree on (−∞, c], and thus, by Step 1,
r j((F j, Fk), 2c) = rk((F j, Fk), 2c). By consistency, r((F j, Fk), t j + tk) = (t j, tk). Thus, by
Lemma 4, (t j − c)(tk − c) ≥ 0. However, c < min{c∗, ck} ≤ c∗ < t j and c > tk, which
contradicts (t j − c)(tk − c) ≥ 0.
Step 11: Equal-quantile rule. The rule r is an equal-quantile rule. Formally, there is
λ ∈ (0, 1] such that for each I ∈ N and each (F,T ) ∈ PI , if T ≤ ∑ ci, for each j ∈ I,
r j(F,T ) = min{c∗, c j}, where c∗ ∈ R+ satisfies
∑
min{c∗, ci} = T, (8)
and if T >
∑
ci, for each j ∈ I,
r j(F,T ) = QF j(α
∗), where α∗ ∈ (0, λ] satisfies
∑
QFi(α
∗) = min
{
T,
∑
QFi(λ)
}
. (9)
Let λ ∈ (0, 1] be given by Step 9. Then for each i ∈ N and each Fi ∈ F , M(Fi) =
QFi(λ) ≥ ci. Let I ∈ N , (F,T ) ∈ PI , and t := r(F,T ). Assume that T ≤
∑
ci. By Step
10, for each j ∈ I, t j is given by (8). Assume that T > ∑ ci. We divide the proof into the
following two cases.
Case 1: T ≥ ∑ QFi(λ). Then ∑ QFi(λ) = min{T,∑ QFi(λ)}. Since T ≥ ∑ QFi(λ) =∑
M(Fi), for each j ∈ I, t j = M(F j), and thus, t j = QF j(λ). Hence, (9) holds with α∗ = λ.
Case 2:
∑
ci < T <
∑
QFi(λ). Then T = min{T,
∑
QFi(λ)}. Since
∑
QFi is continuous
on (0, λ], and since lim
α↓0
∑
QFi(α) =
∑
ci and
∑
ci < T <
∑
QFi(λ), there is α
∗ ∈ (0, λ) such
that
∑
QFi(α
∗) = T . Thus,
∑
QFi(α
∗) = min{T,∑ QFi(λ)}.
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To show that (9) holds, it remains to show that for each j ∈ I, t j = QF j(α∗). Suppose
to the contrary that there is j ∈ I such that t j , QF j(α∗). Since T <
∑
QFi(λ) =
∑
M(Fi),∑
ti = T . Thus,
∑
ti = T =
∑
QFi(α
∗). Since
∑
ti =
∑
QFi(α
∗) and t j , QF j(α
∗), we can
assume without of generality that t j > QF j(α
∗), and for some k ∈ I \ { j}, tk < QFk(α∗). By
Step 8, [lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j), F j(t j)]∩[lim
xk↑tk
Fk(xk), Fk(tk)] , ∅. By the definition of QF j , F j(QF j(α∗)) ≥
α∗. Since t j > QF j(α
∗) and F j(QF j(α
∗)) ≥ α∗, lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j) ≥ α∗. Since tk < QFk(α∗), by the
definition of QFk , Fk(tk) < α
∗. Since Fk(tk) < α∗ ≤ lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j), Fk(tk) < lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j), which
contradicts [lim
x j↑t j
F j(x j), F j(t j)] ∩ [lim
xk↑tk
Fk(xk), Fk(tk)] , ∅, as desired.
A.3 Optimality of equal-quantile rules
As discussed in Section 5, if claims are represented by continuous CDFs, then Proposition 1
can be proved by checking first-order conditions. The extension of the proof to the general
case is standard, and thus, is put in the online appendix.
A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Let cw ≥, cd > 0, and λ ∈ (0, 1] be such that λ = cdcw+cd . Let v := cw and u := cw + cd. Thus,
u > v ≥ 0 and λ = u−vu . Let I ∈ N and (F,T ) ∈ P{I}. Let t be an arbitrary allocation for
(F,T ). The opportunity cost generated by t is the difference between the maximal social
welfare that would be obtained if the resource could be allocated after uncertainty resolves
and the actual social welfare (2). Since u > v ≥ 0, the maximal social welfare is∫
[u min{∑ xi,T } + v(T −min{∑ xi,T })]dF, (10)
achieved by assigning to the agents in the model all of the resource up to their realized needs
and to the outside agent what remains. We will show that the opportunity cost (10)-(2) is
v
∑∫ ti
0
(ti − xi)dFi + (u − v)
∑∫ ∞
ti
(xi − ti)dFi −
∫
∑
xi>T
(u − v)(∑ xi − T )dF. (11)
Since both (10) and the last term of (11) do not depend on t, maximizing (2) is equivalent
to minimizing the sum of the first two terms of (11). Thus, by Proposition 1 and the fact
that v = cw and u = cw + cd, rλ(F,T ) minimizes (4).
We now show that the opportunity cost (10)-(2) is (11). Intuitively, when the endow-
ment T is sufficiently large that the last term of (11) vanishes, as explained in the paragraph
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after Proposition 2, the marginal opportunity cost of waste is v and that of deficit u − v.
When the endowment T is limited so that the last term of (11) is positive, deficit arises
not only from resource misallocation under uncertainty but also from a shortage of the re-
source. Hence, the opportunity cost of deficit is adjusted down by the endowment’s falling
short of the agent’s needs, i.e., the last term of (11). Formally,
(10) − (2) =
∫
[u(min{∑ xi,T } −∑ min{xi, ti}) + v(∑ ti −min{∑ xi,T })]dF
=
∫
∑
xi≤T
[
u(
∑
xi −
∑
min{xi, ti}) + v(
∑
ti −
∑
xi)
]
dF
+
∫
∑
xi>T
[
u(T −
∑
min{xi, ti}) + v(
∑
ti − T )
]
dF
=
∫
∑
xi≤T
[
u(
∑
xi −
∑
min{xi, ti}) + v(
∑
ti −
∑
xi)
]
dF
+
∫
∑
xi>T
[
u(
∑
xi −
∑
min{xi, ti}) + v(
∑
ti −
∑
xi)
]
dF
−
∫
∑
xi>T
(u − v)(∑ xi − T )dF
=
∫ [
u(
∑
xi −
∑
min{xi, ti}) + v(
∑
ti −
∑
xi)
]
dF
−
∫
∑
xi>T
(u − v)(∑ xi − T )dF
=
∑∫
[u(xi −min{xi, ti}) + v(ti − xi)]dFi −
∫
∑
xi>T
(u − v)(∑ xi − T )dF
=(11) (12)
where the second last equality holds since the sum and the expectation are interchangeable
when the integrand is additively separable.39
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